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Abstract
This thesis is composed of two parts. Part I contains two essays on
capital flows and, in particular, on the phenomenon of global imbal-
ances. Part II includes an essay on the determination of exchange
rates.
In the first part, I provide a framework to analyse the trade
imbalances between the United States and East Asian countries.
In a two-country OLG model with production, I investigate the
relationship between East Asian economies’ high propensity to save
and global imbalances. It is suggested that the absence of pay-
as-you-go pension systems can rationalize the saving behaviour of
emerging economies and capital outflows to the United States. The
model supports the view that there is a “global saving glut” in the
world economy. The analysis implies that the introduction of a
pay-as-you-go system in China would have the effect of reducing
the imbalances.
In Chapter 2, I propose a two-country model to capture out-
put per capita inequalities across countries. My motivation is that
global imbalances involve countries at different stages of develop-
ment. Consistently with empirical evidence, I assume that the East
Asian country has a higher capital share in the aggregate produc-
tion function. The analysis shows that technological differences
provide incentives for capital to flow to the developing country.
Given that the net foreign assets position of the United States is
negative, I conclude that differences in social security systems is
the most important basis for trade between the two countries.
In the second part, I develop a theory of nominal exchange rate
determination. The model under study is a stochastic OLG econ-
omy with multiple currencies and goods. Currencies serve as stores
of value and are also required to buy the country-specific good.
Portfolios and nominal exchange rates can be pinned down at the
stochastic steady state. The model makes a first step towards un-
derstanding changes in countries’ net foreign assets positions as
due to both portfolio adjustments and valuation effects driven by
fluctuations of nominal exchange rates.
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Preface
One of the main concerns of international macroeconomists is un-
derstanding countries’ external positions. The external position of
a country can be summarized by two variables. The first one is the
balance of trade, which we can refer to as “excess demand” from the
point of view of general equilibrium theory. The balance of trade is
the synthesis of the flow of goods to and from a country expressed
in a common nume´raire. The second variable is net foreign assets.
Its sign is informative of whether a country is net debtor or cred-
itor towards the rest of the world. These two variables are deeply
interrelated. For example, if a country runs a trade deficit, then
intuition suggests that the country is able to consume more than
what it produces because it is borrowing from abroad.
After the Second World War till the early 1980s, capital flows
among countries were negligible. The celebrated Feldstein-Horioka
paper [27] showed that domestic savings were highly correlated with
domestic investments for a sample of developed countries. Follow-
ing the rise in financial integration over the last two decades, it is
now more frequent to observe trade imbalances. Another aspect
of the same phenomenon is that cross-border holdings of assets has
increased exponentially both for emerging and developed countries.
In this context, no episode has gained more attention than “global
imbalances”, i.e. the trade imbalances between the United States
and East Asian countries. The reasons are several. Firstly, the size
of the trade imbalances is unprecedented as it concerns one of the
richest countries in the world and a large area of growing, emerging
economies. Second, these imbalances are not temporary. Therefore,
global imbalances has now become a stylized fact in international
macroeconomics.
The aim of Chapter 1 is to propose a theory of global imbal-
ances. I choose an overlapping-generations framework as opposed
to a model with infinitely-lived agents, with the purpose of inves-
tigating the relationship between excess savings and global imbal-
ances. In fact, one of the common views on global imbalances is
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that they are the consequence of a “global saving glut”, for which
the high saving rates in East Asian countries are responsible [7]. In
this thesis, it is pointed out that these economies do not have a wel-
fare system as developed as the United States’. In particular, the
absence of pay-as-you go social security systems implies that the
working population need to save more in order to finance old age
consumption. It is plausible that the divergence of the saving rates
can be partially explained by the heterogeneity of pension systems
across countries. In fact, this difference is structural as it can be
observed in the data long before global imbalances emerged. As
such, there is no immediate relationship between the high saving
rates in East Asia and global imbalances.
In a two-country OLG economy with production in which only
one country has a pay-as-you-go system, I show that capital flows to
the country with the pay-as-you-go system. This is consistent with
the fact that the United States’ net foreign asset position has been
negative since the early 1980s, which is when East Asian countries
opened their financial markets. On the other hand, global imbal-
ances are the long-run outcome of the financial integration between
these two countries. Global imbalances arise during the transition
to the world steady state, as soon as the interest rate falls below
the growth rate of the economy. Once at steady state, the country
with the pay-as-you-go system runs a trade deficit forever. Our an-
alytical results indicate that the relationship between the balance
of trade and net foreign assets is not as clear cut as it is commonly
held1. If the borrower country is below the golden rule, the high
interest rate paid on foreign assets (capital outflows) more than
compensate the growth in net foreign liabilities (capital inflows).
Therefore, the country is in trade surplus. Only in the capital over-
accumulation case, the borrower country is in trade deficit. As far
as the phenomenon of global imbalances is concerned, the model
supports the hypothesis that there is a global saving glut in the
world economy and makes the case for a pension reform in China
in the direction of introducing a pay-as-you-go system.
The model of Chapter 1 predicts that, upon financial integration,
the two countries have the same path of capital stock per capita
1Yet, these results are reminiscent of early findings of David Gale [28], [29] for the Solow
model and the OLG model with inside money.
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after the initial adjustment period. I consider this as a weakness
of the theory, since global imbalances involve countries at differ-
ent stages of development. The equalization of capital stocks per
capita is an implication of the assumption that countries produce
the consumption good with an identical technology2. In Chapter 2,
we relax this assumption and allow for heterogenous technologies.
In a constant returns to scale and perfect competition environment,
this implies that income shares are different across countries. As a
matter of principle, it is hard to justify why capital shares should
vary across countries. On the other hand, empirical evidence sug-
gests that the capital share of the main US trading partner, i.e.
China, is higher than the US’.
As a matter of fact, the country with the highest capital share
has a lower output per capita in autarky, and therefore it can be
thought of as a developing country. Since its marginal product of
capital is higher, capital flows to the developing country when the
two countries open to trade. The model shows that output per
capita differences persist although there are no frictions in capital
markets. However, if a pay-as-you-go system is then introduced in
country 1, strong predictions on the pattern of capital flows cannot
be made. On the one hand, the higher capital share induces capital
inflows to the developing country. On the other hand, the coun-
try saves more in the absence of the welfare system. The analysis
concludes with the observation that the “saving channel” must be
more important than the “technology channel”, otherwise the net
foreign assets’ position of the US should be positive in the data.
Finally, I examine the effect of introducing a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem in the developing country as far as global imbalances are con-
cerned. Since there are technological differences inducing capital
flows to the developing country, the pattern of capital flows would
be reversed. Under the assumption that the autarkic interest rate
of the US is the golden rule, the world economy would converge to
a steady state interest rate higher than the growth rate of the econ-
omy. Therefore, the net pattern of trade prevailing in the long-run
2Another view is that GDP per capita differences are due to frictions in international
financial markets. However, Caselli et al. [12] found that marginal products of capita are
equalized across countries, therefore providing evidence in support of a frictionless view of
capital markets.
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would be the same as the one that we observe today. The United
States would run a trade deficit, although in the position of inter-
national lenders.
In the last decade, there have been major advancements in the
open economy literature from an empirical point of view. Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti [41], [43] provided a database on cross-country hold-
ings of assets and liabilities, which is unique in terms of asset disag-
gregation and country coverage. Following this work, international
macroeconomists are no longer exclusively focused on explaining
the determinants of countries’ net foreign assets positions. One of
the important topics on the agenda has become understanding of
how countries allocate national savings across domestic and foreign
assets. Very few theoretical results are available on this front, and
the literature has mainly studied models in which real assets are
traded. However, assets are actually currency-denominated and
the nominal exchange rate matters when agents face a problem of
portfolio choice in open economy.
In Part II (Chapter 3), I propose a new framework aimed at
studying the role of the nominal exchange rate in countries’ port-
folio choices. The model under study is a stochastic OLG economy
with multiple currencies and goods. Agents gain utility from con-
suming L goods but they are only endowed with the country-specific
good (full specialization). Currencies serve as stores of value and
no other assets are available for risk sharing purposes. Therefore,
markets are sequentially incomplete. Money has also a transac-
tion role, since currencies are needed to buy the country-specific
good. This assumption allows to pin down portfolios and nominal
exchange rates at the stochastic steady state. The fact that we find
existence of stationary equilibrium in a number of examples is rele-
vant to the literature on the stochastic OLG model, since existence
is not generic in this class of models when L ≥ 2.
First, I compute the analytical solution of an example with log
utility and zero endowment in the second period of life. While useful
to gain some intuition, this example is very special as the exchange
rate and portfolios happen to be constant in equilibrium. We then
generalize to isoelastic utility functions. Under this specification,
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the model does not have closed-form solutions, but it is still possible
to compute the demand functions.
The model is able to generate state-dependent portfolios, even
under identical homothetic preferences. In particular, I show that
the distribution of money holdings is related to the distribution of
wealth among countries. Trade imbalances also arise as a conse-
quence of wealth, and therefore portfolios, being state dependent.
For instance, a country is in surplus whenever its share of aggregate
wealth is higher than in the immediate past. The nominal exchange
rate is shown to be a function of the expected relative purchasing
power of the two currencies, and fluctuates unless the stochastic
process is i.i.d..
Thanks to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s work, we are now aware
that the dynamics of the net foreign assets of a country is not exclu-
sively driven by trade imbalances. Movements in the value of assets
and liabilities, which are not incorporated in national accounts and
are known as “valuation effects”, are quantitatively important.
The model presented in Chapter 3, albeit stylized, makes a first
step towards understanding changes in countries’ net foreign assets
positions as due to both portfolio adjustments and valuation effects
linked to fluctuations of nominal exchange rates. In the model,
countries are in fact hit by positive (negative) valuation effects on
their net foreign assets’ position when the domestic currency de-
preciates (appreciates). Our numerical results indicate that the
balance of trade comove negatively with valuation effects as long
as the Markov process is persistent. The intuition can be briefly
explained as follows. If a country experiences a positive shock, it
runs a trade surplus since it holds more money than in the past.
Since agents expect a high value of the endowment tomorrow, they
desire more domestic currency as they wish to substitute the do-
mestic for the foreign good. On the other hand, money supply is
fixed. Therefore, the relative price of the domestic currency has
to increase to counterbalance agents’ high demand. Since the do-
mestic currency appreciates, the country then experiences negative
valuation effects.
Finally, for reasonable ranges of parameter values, valuation ef-
fects are sizable as they reduce the impact of current account po-
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sitions on changes in net foreign assets by more than a half. Other
papers find instead extremely small valuation effects3.
3See, for example, Devereux et al. [21]. However, it is important to stress that valuation
effects are of a different nature in [21]. They are driven by changes in equity prices and not
by exchange rate fluctuations.
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A theory of global
imbalances
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Chapter 1
An OLG model of global
imbalances
1.1 Introduction
Not only too little capital flows from rich to poor countries - as
Lucas [45] pointed out - but we have observed the reverse pat-
tern of net capital flows for over a decade. The trade imbalances
between the United States and East Asian economies, or global
imbalances, do not appear to be a temporary phenomenon. Fig-
ure 1.1 shows that the United States’ current account deficit has
steadily deteriorated since the late 1990s. The recent adjustment
has involved trade with Europe and oil-producing countries, but
not other emerging economies. In particular, the US deficit to-
wards China, which mirrors very closely the Chinese surplus, did
not shrink with the recession.
One of the most common views on global imbalances is the
“global saving glut hypothesis”, due to Bernanke [6]. The core
of the argument is that the high saving rates in East Asia have
created an excess of savings in the world economy, which has re-
sulted in capital flows towards the US and low real interest rates.
Bernanke [6] also claimed that the understanding of global imbal-
ances requires a “global perspective” and that they do not “pri-
marily reflect economic policies and other economic developments
within the United States itself”. In other words, current account
imbalances must be thought of as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In this chapter, we provide a general equilibrium framework to
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discuss the global saving glut hypothesis and therefore investigate
the relationship between emerging countries’ high propensity to
save and global imbalances. An interesting - and key, to us - as-
pect of the data is that while global imbalances emerged in the late
1990s, that East Asian countries save more than the United States
is certainly not a new fact. Figure 1.2 depicts the saving rates of
the US and a few East Asian countries over the last 30 years.
The heterogeneity in the pension systems is one of the plausible
candidates to explain the structural difference in the countries’ sav-
ing rates. In fact, pay-as-you-go social security systems are nearly
absent in many emerging economies. Reforms aimed at introduc-
ing state pensions are still underway in China and other East Asian
economies1. On the other hand, the pay-as-you go system was in-
troduced in the United States during the Great Depression. There
is a substantial body of evidence - summarized in [27] - which indi-
cates that the pay-as-you-go system had the effect of crowding out
private saving in the US. More generally, cross-sectional evidence
[58] supports the idea that countries with pay-as-you-go systems
tend to have lower saving rates, especially the more extensive is
the coverage. Yet, the implications for global imbalances of the
fact that East Asian countries need to save more to finance old age
consumption are still unexplored. One of the contributions of this
work is to fill this gap in the literature.
The model that we study is a two-country OLG model with
production along the lines of Diamond [26], in which the two coun-
tries are identical except that only one country has a pay-as-you-go
social security system. The Diamond model is a natural frame-
work to address the question of excess savings in an economy. In
fact, the model admits the possibility that, in a perfectly compet-
itive economy, there is capital overaccumulation. The concept of
“excess savings” has a precise meaning in the OLG model as it cor-
responds to the notion of dynamic inefficiency, and this motivates
our modeling choice.
In section 2 and 3, we present the model and characterize the
1On the Chinese case, see “Social Security Reform in China: Issues and Options” at
Peter A. Diamond’s webpage: http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/691. Diamond was one of the
leading economists who participated at this study on social security reforms in China. On
pension systems in Asia, see e.g. [8].
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direction of capital flows and trade at and outside steady states.
First, we show that the emerging country always lends to the
developed country, as the young of the former country save rela-
tively more in the absence of the pay-as-you-go system2. Yet, the
pattern of trade in the consumption good does depend on the long-
run efficiency of the world economy. We prove that the direction of
trade depends on how the population growth rate compares with
the interest rate, and this is also the case outside steady states.
The emerging country runs a trade surplus only as long as the
world economy is beyond the golden rule level of capital (capital
overaccumulation). Otherwise, the emerging country runs a trade
deficit despite the fact that it’s the lender country. Only in the
coincidental case of the golden rule, trade happens to be balanced.
The main implication of these results is that we would not ob-
serve the current pattern of trade if there was not an excess of
savings in the world economy. In this sense, our work provides a
formal argument in favor of the “global saving glut hypothesis”.
Caballero et al. [10] argue that the saving glut story can be inter-
preted within their framework, by positively shocking the emerging
country’s saving parameter. Here, a global excess of savings arise
endogenously, as a long-term consequence of the financial integra-
tion between the United States and East Asian countries.
Another interesting aspect of the trade balance result is that the
developed country runs a trade deficit in the capital overaccumu-
lation case because aggregate consumption is higher than in the
other country. The reason is that pensions’ growth is high enough
to compensate interest payments to the emerging country. It is of-
ten claimed that global imbalances are due to the fact that emerging
countries are consuming too little. This model shows that this is
nothing but equilibrium behavior.
Our findings are related to two seminal papers of David Gale
[28], [29]. Gale made the important point that countries can run
permanent trade imbalances in general equilibrium models. His
intuition was that this is especially possible in OLG economies.
Gale had discovered that the sign of the balance of trade depends
2Geide-Stevenson [33] found the same result in a two-country Diamond model in which
the pay-as-you-go tax is proportional rather than lump-sum. Her analysis is limited to steady
states, here we also look at the dynamics of capital flows.
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on efficiency properties in a Solow model with heterogenous agents
and in a pure exchange OLG economy with inside money. The
paper is also related to Polemarchakis and Salto [53], which found
that trade is balanced at the golden rule in a pure exchange OLG
economy with outside money.
Previous work on international capital mobility that use the Dia-
mond model as a framework include Buiter [9] and Geide-Stevenson
[33]. Buiter [9] studies a two-country Diamond model in which
the countries are heterogeneous in the discount factors, and finds
that the most patient country always runs a current account sur-
plus at the steady state, but not necessarily outside it. Following
Buiter’s paper, Geide-Stevenson [33] established that the social se-
curity country always runs a current account deficit at the steady
state. On the contrary, we claim that the current account of the
social security country can be in surplus both at and outside steady
states, when interest rates are higher than the population growth
rate. The reason for this divergence in the results is that the bal-
ance of trade equation, as stemming from the good market clearing
equation, already includes net income from abroad. In fact, interest
payments are done in the consumption good. The balance of trade
must coincide with the current account in the Diamond model. This
is why Buiter [9] and Geide-Stevenson [33] downplayed the impor-
tance of efficiency properties in their assessment of countries’ net
external position.
In section 4, we study the dynamics of capital flows and global
imbalances for plausible initial conditions of the autarkic economies.
It turns out that the model is able to account for the dynamics and
the timing of global imbalances, as well as the dynamics of real
interest rates and net foreign asset positions. First, the model can
rationalize the fact that the US current account and real interest
rates deteriorated gradually (Figure 1.1 and 1.4). Second, the model
can explain why the accumulation of net foreign liabilities started
in the early 1980s (Figure 1.3), well before the emergence of global
imbalances3.
The model provides intuitive explanations for these facts. Be-
cause of their higher saving rates, emerging countries started to lend
abroad soon after they opened to trade with the US. The decline
3See section 4 for a comparison with the literature on these stylized facts.
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of real interest rates can be read as a consequence of capital ac-
cumulation in the world economy (Figure 1.4). Global imbalances
arose as soon as interest rates fell below the long-run growth rate,
implying that the world economy is saving too much.
Finally, we ask whether it is plausible that the economy is expe-
riencing a global saving glut. According to the model, this requires
that the long-run growth rate of the economy is higher than the real
interest rate. We find evidence of this in the data. This is hardly
surprising, since US real interest rates have hit a historic low in the
past decade.
This paper is mainly related to the body of literature which puts
emphasis on differences in institutions as the main determinant of
global imbalances, e.g. Caballero et al. [10], Mendoza et al. [49]
and Angeletos et al. [2]. These papers’ focus is on financial mar-
kets’ different stages of development, and yet the sense of our anal-
ysis is similar as the type of pension system enforced in a country
surely affects saving and investment possibilities. Caballero et al.
[10] explain global imbalances as the result of a negative shock to
emerging countries’ level of financial development, while our view
is that global imbalances arose as the outcome of the financial in-
tegration between the US and emerging economies. In this respect,
this paper is closer to Mendoza et al. [49] and Angeletos et al. [2].
The novel element of this model is that global imbalances are
neither a temporary phenomenon, meant to disappear in the long-
run (in [49] and [2]), nor a benign aspect of the world economy
(as in [10]). Moreover, the presence of excess savings in an OLG
economy means that there is room for policy interventions.
Hence, this paper contributes to the debate on whether and how
the imbalances should be addressed from a policy point of view.
While there is widespread agreement that global imbalances must
be reduced, this is advocated on the basis of a variety of arguments4.
It is often claimed that East Asian countries should introduce
policies to boost domestic demand, in view of correcting the im-
balances. If we accept that the world economy is overaccumulating
capital, long-term policies in this direction are clearly desirable. For
instance, the introduction of a pay-as-you-go system in China would
not only be Pareto-improving but also have the effect of reducing
4See a recent collection of papers written by central bankers on the topic [34].
20
the imbalances.
1.2 The world economy
In this section, we describe the two-country model, which maintains
the basic structure of Diamond (1965). We will refer to country 1
(2) as the developed (emerging) country.
Agents live for two periods and a new generation is born in
each country for all t. The size of the population follows Li,t =
Li,0(1 + n)
t, where Li,0 are the young born in country i at date 0
and n is the (common) population growth rate5. The only source
of growth in the model comes from population6.
The two countries only differ in the pension systems. Country
1 has a pay-as-you-go social security system, while the system in
country 2 is fully-funded. Country 1’s government levies a time-
invariant lump-sum tax τ1 on the young, which is used to finance
the old’s pension b1 at each t. The policy is balanced so that taxes
are equal to transfers at each t: τ1L1,t = b1L1,t−1. It follows that
the transfer which the current old receive is equal to b1 = (1+n)τ1,
i.e. each generation receives a transfer which is bigger than the tax
if population is increasing.
Finally, we need to specify which markets are open for interna-
tional trade. We assume that the consumption good can be cost-
lessly traded between the countries. As our focus is to analyze the
pattern of trade in the good, we impose that labor is immobile.
1.2.1 Firms
Competitive firms use capital and labor to produce the consumption
good by means of an identical, constant returns technology: Yi,t =
F (Ki,t, Li,t).
As anticipated above, firms located in country i can only hire
workers in the domestic labor market. We consider the production
function in its intensive form as the number of workers is given
at each t: yi,t = f(ki,t). The function f is strictly increasing and
5This is realistic as the population of both China and the United States have grown at
an average rate of 1% for the last 30 years (World Bank data). However, we allow for the
countries’ size to be different.
6See Appendix A for an extension of the model with labour augmenting technological
progress.
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concave in ki,t. Capital depreciates at the constant rate 0 6 δ 6
1 in both countries and we assume that the following boundary
conditions hold:
lim
ki,t→+∞
f ′(ki,t) = 0 lim
ki,t→0
f ′(ki,t) = +∞
At time 0, the two autarkic economies open to trade after produc-
tion has taken place. Their “initial” level of capital will respectively
be k1,0 and k2,0. Starting from period 1, firms’ demand for capital
is met in the world market and therefore they will face the same
path of interest rates {rt}. Firms solve the following maximization
problem:
max
ki,t
pii,t = f(ki,t)− (rt + δ)ki,t − wi,t ∀ i, t > 1 (1.1)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are:
rt = f
′(ki,t)− δ (1.2)
wi,t = f(ki,t)− f ′(ki,t)ki,t (1.3)
Because the countries have access to the same technology, it is
immediate that capital stocks per capita are equalized: because
k1,t = k2,t = kt, it is also true that w1,t = w2,t = wt for all t.
While the two countries might start with different initial conditions,
potential income differences vanish once the two countries open to
trade.
This assumption is somewhat strong, but it is convenient to ab-
stract from other potential bases for trade to study how differences
in pension systems have an impact on capital accumulation and
trade7.
1.2.2 Consumers
Agents get utility from consuming in the two periods of life. Pref-
erences are stationary and identical both within generation and
across countries. The utility function is C2, strictly increasing,
strictly concave and additively separable:
U(cti,t, c
t
i,t+1) = u(c
t
i,t) + βv(c
t
i,t+1) (1.4)
7In Chapter 2, we will allow for technologies to be different across countries.
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where cti,t denotes consumption when young and c
t
i,t+1 is consump-
tion when old of the generation (born at time) t in country i. Also:
lim
cti,t→0
u′(cti,t) = +∞ lim
cti,t+1→0
u′(cti,t+1) = +∞
The budget constraints are:
cti,t = wt − τi − si,t (1.5)
cti,t+1 = si,t(1 + rt+1) + τi(1 + n) (1.6)
where τ2 = 0 as there is no pay-as-you-go system in country 2. In
our two-country world, the young are allowed to lend both to do-
mestic and foreign firms. Which country is going to be the borrower
(lender) will be established in equilibrium.
The maximization problems of the two consumers are the fol-
lowing:
maxs1,t u(wt − τ1 − s1,t) + βv(s1,t(1 + rt+1) + τ1(1 + n))(1.7)
maxs2,t u(wt − s2,t) + βv(s2,t(1 + rt+1)) (1.8)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are:
u′(wt − τ1 − s1,t) = β(1 + rt+1)v′(s1,t(1 + rt+1) + τ1(1 + n))(1.9)
u′(wt − s2,t) = β(1 + rt+1)v′(s2,t(1 + rt+1)) (1.10)
Agents’ optimal savings are then a function of the wage and the
interest rate. In country 1, they also depend upon the taxes and
transfers related to the pension system.
In the OLG model, it is well known that savings are lower in
presence of a pay-as-you-go system (see e.g. [3], or [57]):
ds1,t
dτ1
= −u
′′(ct1,t) + β(1 + n)(1 + rt+1)v
′′(ct1,t+1)
u′′(ct1,t) + β(1 + rt+1)2v′′(c
t
1,t+1)
< 0 (1.11)
Given that agents face the same factor prices (wt, rt+1), we can
claim that the young in country 1 save less than in country 2. It is
also known that the extent of the fall in saving will depend on how
n and rt+1 compares. In particular, if n > rt+1(< rt+1) then the
drop in saving is larger since ds1,t
dτ1
< −1(> −1). In fact, the income
of country 1’s consumers is higher (lower) when the rate of return
on the pension system is higher (lower) than the interest rate. This
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can be seen from the consolidated budget constraint:
ct1,t +
ct1,t+1
1 + rt+1
= wt − τ1 rt+1 − n
1 + rt+1
(1.12)
When n > rt+1, c
t
1,t increases, since consumption is a normal good
8.
Therefore, savings will be even lower. Only when n = rt+1, savings
decrease one for one with the tax as (1.11) shows.
We also characterize the saving functions by the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 1 Consumption when young and when old are gross
substitutes:
sr > 0
where sr is the partial derivative of the saving function with
respect to the interest rate.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
Given (τ1, k1,0, k2,0), a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of cap-
ital stocks {k∗t }t>1 and factor prices {r∗t , w∗t }t>1 such that:
(i) {ct∗i,t, ct∗i,t+1}t>0 maximize the agents’ utility function (1.4) sub-
ject to the budget constraints (1.5),(1.6) for all i;
(ii) {k∗t }t>1 maximize the firms’ profit function (1.1);
(iii) the (world) capital market clears for t > 0:∑
i
Li,ts
∗
i,t =
∑
i
K∗i,t+1
If the capital market clears at each t, the (world) market for the
good will clear by Walras’ Law. The good market is in equilibrium
when the total resources available (after production) are equal to
the consumption of the current young and old, and next period’s
capital stocks of the two countries.∑
i
F (K∗i,t, Li,t) + (1− δ)
∑
i
K∗i,t = (1.13)
=
∑
i
Li,tc
t∗
i,t +
∑
i
Li,t−1ct−1∗i,t +
∑
i
K∗i,t+1
8That savings are increasing in the wage can be derived from the first-order conditions.
It can be checked that
dsi,t
dwt
= 1
1+β(1+rt+1)2
v′′(ct
i,t+1
)
u′′(ct
i,t
)
, therefore 0 < sw < 1.
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Equation (1.14) will be extensively used in the next section to study
the pattern of trade between the two countries.
1.3 The pattern of trade
1.3.1 Dynamics in the capital market and capital flows
In this section, we analyze the direction of capital flows in the model
described above. The first step is to study how capital accumulates.
The capital market is equilibrium in as long as the world demand
for capital is equal to the world supply (savings):
K∗t+1 ≡
∑
i
K∗i,t+1 = L1,ts1(f(k
∗
1,t)− f ′(k∗1,t)k∗1,t, f ′(k∗t+1), τ1) +
+ L2,ts2(f(k
∗
2,t)− f ′(k∗2,t)k∗2,t, f ′(k∗t+1)) (1.14)
where K∗t+1 denotes the world capital stock at time t+ 1. We have
already established that k1,t = k2,t = kt for t > 1, while at t = 0
countries might start with different levels of capital.
Before proceeding, it is convenient to introduce the following
definition:
Definition 1 Country i’s size is: ρi ≡ L0,iL0 .
Because the countries grow at a common rate, ρi is constant over
time and depends on the countries’ initial labor forces. We can now
divide (1.14) by the world labor supply Lt and get:
(1 + n)k∗t+1 = ρ1s1(f(k
∗
1,t)− f ′(k∗1,t)k∗1,t, f ′(k∗t+1), τ1) +
+ ρ2s2(f(k
∗
2,t)− f ′(k∗2,t)k∗2,t, f ′(k∗t+1)) (1.15)
At each t, the world capital stock per capita (which is equiva-
lent to the domestic capital stocks) is determined by the savings
of country 1 and 2. Equation (1.15) shows that each country will
contribute to the supply side of the market according to its size.
Hereafter, we study the above difference equation in the capital
stock. The world economy is in steady state when k∗t = k
∗
t+1 = k
∗:
(1 + n)k∗ = ρ1s1[f(k∗)− f ′(k∗)k∗, f ′(k∗), τ1] +
+ ρ2s2[f(k
∗)− f ′(k∗)k∗, f ′(k∗)] (1.16)
Lemma 1 (i) Given k1,0 > 0 and k2,0 > 0, there exists a unique
intertemporal equilibrium as long as τ1 < τ¯1(k1,0).
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(ii) If limkt→0
φ(kt;τ1,ρ1,ρ2)
kt
> 1, there exists at least a stable steady
state.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. The function φ is defined
there.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 establishes that there exists an equilibrium
path only if each country’s savings are positive at t = 0. It is
intuitive that we need a condition on the tax level to avoid cir-
cumstances under which income is either zero or negative in the
initial period. In other words, a perfect foresight equilibrium will
exist only if the level of the tax is compatible with having positive
savings in the economy9. Part (ii) shows that there exist paths
converging to a stable steady state. This is important as the focus
of the next section will be on the behavior of the economy near a
stable steady state.
We can now analyze the pattern of trade between the countries10.
We start with trade in the capital market. Given the capital market
equilibrium equation, it is immediate to show which of the two
countries has positive excess demand for capital.
Definition 2 The (per capita) excess demand function of country
i is:
zi,t ≡ (1 + n)kt+1 − si,t (1.17)
By dividing the capital market clearing equation by world popula-
tion, we get that ρ1z
∗
1,t + ρ2z
∗
2,t = 0 using the above definition.
Proposition 1 (Borrowing and lending) Country 1 (2) is the
borrower (lender) country for all t > 1.
Proof. First, substitute equation (1.15) into the excess demand
function of country i. Equilibrium excess demands are:
z∗1,t = ρ2(s
∗
2,t − s∗1,t) z∗2,t = −ρ1(s∗2,t − s∗1,t) (1.18)
From equation (1.11), we know that country 1 saves less than coun-
try 2 given factor prices. Therefore, it must be true that s∗2,t > s
∗
1,t
9See [25] for a detailed analysis of the (closed economy) Diamond model with lump-sum
transfers.
10We postpone the discussion of the pattern of trade at the openness to section 4, where
we study the dynamics of capital flows and global imbalances for realistic initial conditions
of the autarkic economies.
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for all k∗t , k
∗
t+1. The sign of excess demand for the two countries
follows:
z∗1,t > 0 z
∗
2,t < 0 ∀ t > 1 (1.19)
Proposition 1 shows that country 2 (the emerging country) will
always lend to country 1, it does not matter whether the economy
is in a steady state or not. The intuition behind this result is
simple. We know that the equilibrium capital stock is combination
of savings in the two countries and the developed country saves
less than the emerging economy. Therefore, while country 1 has to
borrow to sustain k∗t+1, country 2’s savings (partly) find an outlet
in country 1.
It might be noted that the extent of trade will depend on how
large is the difference between the two countries’ savings. For in-
stance, countries trade more the bigger is the size of the pay-as-
you-go system in country 1. It is worth stressing that the direction
of trade in the capital market does not depend on whether we are
in the capital overaccumulation case or not. However, this becomes
relevant once we consider the countries’ net trade.
1.3.2 The balance of trade and efficiency
We can now study the pattern of trade in the consumption good.
First, we define the balance of trade of country i as the country’s
excess supply for the consumption good.
Definition 3 The (per capita) trade balance of country i is:
tb∗i,t ≡ f(k∗i,t) + (1− δ)k∗i,t − ct∗i,t −
ct−1∗i,t
1 + n
− k∗i,t+1(1 + n) (1.20)
If tb∗i,t > 0 in equilibrium, then country i is net exporter as output
is higher than “domestic absorption”.
A few words are due to explain the above definition, as it is of
fundamental importance for the results of the paper. Definition 3
stems from the per capita version of (1.14), the consumption good’s
market clearing equation. Equation (1.14) states that the sum of
the countries’ balances must be zero at each t. Once we divide it by
the world population Lt, we obtain that ρ1tb1,t + ρ2tb2,t = 0. While
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this equation must hold, that tb∗i,t 6= 0 for every i is still possible in
equilibrium.
Another way to look at the balance of trade is in terms of net
capital flows. Use the fact that f(k∗i,t) = w
∗
t + (r
∗
t + δ)k
∗
i,t to get:
tb∗i,t = w
∗
t + (r
∗
t + δ)k
∗
i,t + (1− δ)k∗i,t − ct∗i,t −
ct−1∗i,t
1 + n
− k∗i,t+1(1 + n)
Using the budget constraints of the young and the old living at time
t, we obtain:
tb∗i,t ≡ [s∗i,t − k∗i,t+1(1 + n)]−
(
1 + r∗t
1 + n
)
[s∗i,t−1 − k∗i,t(1 + n)] (1.21)
Next, using Definition 2 rewrite (1.21) as follows:
tb∗i,t = −z∗i,t +
(
1 + r∗t
1 + n
)
z∗i,t−1 (1.22)
The above characterization shows that the balance of trade reflects
trade in the capital market in period t and t− 1.
Proposition 2 (Balance of trade and steady states) At the
golden rule allocation (r∗ = n), trade is balanced.
If the steady state is inefficient (r∗ < n), country 2 (the emerging
country) is in surplus while country 1 (the developed country) is in
deficit.
If the steady state is efficient (r∗ > n), the opposite is true.
Proof. Consider equation (1.22). Imposing z∗i,t = z
∗
i,t−1 = z
∗
i and
r∗t = r
∗, the trade balance of country i in the steady state is:
tb∗i = −z∗i
(
n− r∗
1 + n
)
(1.23)
It immediately follows that at the golden rule allocation tbi = 0 ∀ i.
The other statements are a direct implication of our hypotheses and
the sign of z∗i (Proposition 1).
If the world economy converges to a steady state such that r∗ = n,
not only steady state consumption will be maximized but trade will
be balanced in the long-run. Yet, that trade is balanced does not
imply that the two countries do not trade at all. In fact, trade in the
capital market still takes place at the golden rule (by Proposition 1)
but each country’s capital outflows are completely offset by capital
inflows.
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However, this can only happen by coincidence. In all other cases,
there will be trade imbalances between the two countries. To com-
ment on the result, let us consider the balance of trade of country
2:
tb∗2 = −z∗2︸︷︷︸
capital outflow
+
(
1 + r∗
1 + n
)
z∗2︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital inflow
We have seen that the young in country 2 lend to firms located
in country 1 as they save relatively more (capital outflow). At
the same time, the old of country 1 pay the loan back, along with
interest payments, to the old of country 2 (capital inflow).
The proposition states that the sign of net capital flows (or the
balance of trade) will depend on how n and r∗ compares. Indeed,
notice that while z∗i is constant at the steady state, Z
∗
i,t will grow at
the population growth rate. Proposition 2 then says that the lender
country will have a surplus as long as the net income from abroad is
not enough to compensate the increase in capital outflows induced
by population growth. Instead, if the interest rate was higher than
the population growth rate, country 2 should be in deficit.
Therefore, the model implies that the reason why the US run
a trade deficit is that there is a saving glut in the world economy.
We postpone to section 4 the discussion of whether it is plausible
that the world economy is on an inefficient path, with the support
of some empirical evidence.
The fact that the sign of the balance of trade of a country de-
pends on whether the world economy happens to be below or be-
yond the golden rule allocation is not just true at the steady state of
the model. Next, we show that this holds outside stationary states
too.
To this purpose, it is more convenient to work with equation
(1.20). As technologies are identical, it is intuitive that all the
action has to come from aggregate consumption. Because pension
systems are different, the countries’ consumption possibilities are
not the same and this will explain the direction of trade in the
consumption good.
Lemma 2 (Consumption) For any generation t > 1, the agent
born in country 1 consume relatively more (less) when n > rt+1
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(< rt+1).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.
In Lemma 2, we show that agents born in country 1 consume
more in the capital overaccumulation case. It is interesting to note
that this result supports the idea that East Asian countries are
consuming too little relatively to the United States, and this has
something to do with global imbalances. The reason is that coun-
try 1’s generations have a higher income, despite that the United
States have to pay interest rates to China. When n > r∗t+1, there
is enough growth in the economy for the pension to compensate
interest payments to the foreign country. In other words, the net
present value of the pay-as-you-go system is positive in the capital
overaccumulation case. An examination of the two agents’ budget
constraints should convince the reader of this fact.
Given Lemma 2, we can analyze the pattern of trade in the
consumption good outside steady states:
Proposition 3 (Balance of trade outside steady states) Country
1 (the developed country) is in deficit at a given t when n > r∗t and
n > r∗t+1, while in surplus when r
∗
t > n and r
∗
t+1 > n. If r
∗
t > n and
r∗t+1 < n, the sign is ambiguous.
Proof. We consider the developed country, the opposite is obvi-
ously true for the emerging economy. If country 1 imports, then
tb1,t < tb2,t. Given Definition 3 and because k1,t = k2,t ∀ t > 1, the
following must hold for country 1 to be in deficit:
ct∗1,t +
ct−1∗1,t
1 + n
> ct∗2,t +
ct−1∗2,t
1 + n
Indeed, Lemma 2 showed that consumption is higher for generations
in country 1 as long as next period’s interest rate is lower than the
population growth rate. Therefore, for tb1,t < 0 it is sufficient
that n > r∗t and n > r
∗
t+1. Instead, when r
∗
t > n and r
∗
t+1 > n
generations of country 2 consume more and tb2,t < 0.
Suppose that at a given t, we have that r∗t > n but next pe-
riod’s interest rate falls below the population growth rate. While
ct∗1,t−1 < c
t∗
2,t−1 by r
∗
t > n, c
t∗
1,t > c
t∗
2,t by r
∗
t+1 < n. The net effect will
depend on other parameters of the economy (see Appendix A.2 for
an illustration in the Cobb-Douglas case).
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The proposition establishes that the deficit (surplus) country is
the country which consumes relatively more (less) at a given t.
At the golden rule, it is worth noting that the consumption allo-
cation of the two representative generations is identical despite the
different pension systems (see the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix
A). This gives a different angle to the balanced trade result. Be-
cause savings decrease one for one with τ1 and consumers’ wealth
is not affected by the pension system when r∗ = n, consumption
choices in the two countries are the same at the golden rule. In-
deed, the planner would choose such allocation if giving the same
weights to the agents (in fact, we did not allow for heterogeneity in
preferences).
In this section, we have looked at the sign of the balance of trade
as the trade balance is what drives the behaviour of the current
account of the US and China. From equation (1.22), we can also
derive an expression that relates the change in net foreign assets
of a country (or current account) to the balance of trade and net
income from abroad.
First, the net foreign asset position of country i at the beginning
of period t+ 1 is equivalent to the amount of good which has been
“exported” or lent to the other country in the previous period:
Ai,t+1 ≡ −Zi,t. Therefore, equation (1.22) can be rewritten as:
tb∗i,t = (1 + n)a
∗
i,t+1 − (1 + r∗t )a∗i,t
Finally, the current account of country i is the sum of the balance
of trade and net income from abroad and it is also equivalent to
the change in the net foreign asset position of the country:
ca∗i,t ≡ (1 + n)a∗i,t+1 − a∗i,t = tb∗i,t + r∗t a∗i,t
At the steady state of the economy, the current account of the
lender (borrower) country will always be in surplus (deficit) as the
country is accumulating net foreign assets at the growth rate of the
world economy:
na∗i = tb
∗
i + r
∗a∗i
This result can be interpreted as follows. The current account of
a country is usually defined as domestic savings minus domestic
investment. As capital stocks per capita are equalized across coun-
tries, it is not investments per capita that drive the behaviour of
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the current account in the model. The lender country is always in
surplus due to the fact that aggregate savings are relatively higher
in the other country to the absence of the pay-as-you-go system.
Finally, it is worth noting that the sign of the balance of trade
will closely follow the sign of the current account only if we are in
the capital overaccumulation case.
1.4 The dynamics of net foreign assets and global
imbalances
The results of section 3 imply that the dynamics of the countries’
balance of trade are strongly related to the efficiency of the world
economy’s capital accumulation path. In particular, we have found
that the lender country (the country with no pay-as-you-go pension
system) runs a trade surplus only as long as the population growth
rate is higher than the interest rate. Therefore, our theoretical
results suggest that global imbalances are a signal that the world
economy is overaccumulating capital.
In this section, we demonstrate that the model is able to quali-
tatively replicate the evolution of the US current account and net
foreign assets’ position since the early 1980s (the time of China’s
integration into the world economy). Second, we provide some ev-
idence to support the claim that there is a “global saving glut” in
the world economy. If we can say that the long-run growth rate of
the world economy is higher than the real interest rate, it is then
plausible that the world economy is on an equilibrium path char-
acterized by an excess of savings.
To start with, we need to address the following questions. What
are the conditions under which the world economy converges to
an inefficient steady state? And are these reasonable enough? To
make progress on these issues, we introduce some assumptions on
the characteristics of the two countries in autarky. Moreover, we
make a conjecture on the two countries’ initial conditions at time
0, which would correspond to the financial openness of emerging
countries11.
11Lemma 1 established that there exists at least a stable steady state for the world economy.
In this section, we restrict attention to those paths converging to a stable steady state.
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Hypothesis 1 (Autarkic steady states) Suppose country 1 has
a locally stable steady state such that rautss1 = n. For country 2, the
locally stable steady state satisfies n > raut2 .
Hypothesis 2 (Initial conditions) At the time of financial inte-
gration t = 0, country 1 is at the autarkic steady state k1,0 ≡ kautss1 .
Country 2’s initial capital stock satisfies k2,0 < k
aut
2 . Moreover,
it is low enough that k2,0 < k1,0 and s1(k1,0, k
∗
1, τ1) > s2(k2,0, k
∗
1),
where k∗1 is the equilibrium capital stock at t = 1.
Our main hypothesis is that the pay-as-you-go system, which has
been introduced during the Great Depression, “fixed” the long-run
inefficiency of the US economy. This assumption is also consistent
with the fact that the US current account was balanced before 1980.
We then assume that the autarkic steady state of the emerging
economy is inefficient in the absence of social security. This is
coherent with our previous analysis, as we treated the two countries
as identical (except for the pension systems).
That country 2 opened to trade with a relatively low capital
stock and along its transition path, while country 1 was already
at the autarkic steady state, should not be controversial. We will
explain Hypothesis 2 in more detail in the context of Proposition
5.
We are now ready to characterize the long-run equilibrium of
the world economy.
Proposition 4 (World steady state) Under Hypothesis 1, the
world economy has a locally stable steady state such that n > r∗.
Proof. It suffices to show that the (world) interest rate is between
the autarkic interest rates: rautss1 > r
∗ > raut2 , because we assumed
that rautss1 = n (see Appendix A for a proof).
From Hypothesis 2, it can be inferred that the initial conditions
of the world economy are such that the world economy starts to the
left of the steady state. Our next step is to study trade dynamics
in this context. First, we analyze trade at the time of China’s
financial integration. For instance, t = 0 could roughly correspond
to 1980. That the world capital market is open means that the
young can lend both to domestic and foreign firms. As it might be
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expected, the pattern of trade at the openness will depend on the
two countries’ initial conditions.
Proposition 5 (Financial integration) Under Hypothesis 2, (i)
the developed country is the lender and runs a trade surplus at t = 0;
(ii) the developed country runs a trade deficit at t = 1.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.
The proof shows that k∗1 is pinned down by total savings at
t = 0, which depend on the two countries’ initial conditions. At the
outset of financial integration, a realistic scenario is one in which
capital flows to the capital scarce, emerging country. To impose
that k2,0 < k1,0 is not enough because while country 1 has a higher
wage, there is the negative partial equilibrium effect of the pay-
as-you-go on country 1’s savings to take into account. Therefore,
we need more stringent conditions for country 1 to save more and
therefore lend to country 2 (Hypothesis 2).
At t = 1, the developed country’s current account position turns
into deficit: the old in country 2 pay off their debt and country 1
now starts to borrow.
In the previous section, we established that capital flows to the
developed country for t ≥ 1 and that the sign of the balance of
trade depends on whether the interest rate is higher or lower than
the population growth rate. Here, we study the dynamics of net
foreign assets and the balance of trade in more detail. We restrict
our analysis to the case in which both the utility and the production
functions are Cobb-Douglas, since it is analytically tractable:
Assumption 2 The utility and the production functions are Cobb-
Douglas:
U(cti,t, c
t
i,t+1) = β log c
t
i,t + (1− β) log cti,t+1
F (Ki,t, Li,t) = K
α
i,tL
1−α
i,t
We fully derive the model under Assumption 2 in Appendix A. For
our purposes, it is important to stress that the capital stock evolves
over time as follows:
(1 + n)k∗t+1 = (1− β)(1− α)k∗αt −
− ρ1τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
]
(1.24)
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In particular, capital stock convergence is monotonic as the saving
locus is increasing:
dkt+1
dkt
=
(1− β)α(1− α)kα−1t
(1 + n)− ρ1τ1β(1+n)α(α−1)k
α−2
t+1
(1+αkα−1t+1 −δ)2
> 0 (1.25)
Figure 1.3 illustrates the path of capital accumulation in the world
economy under such assumptions on technology and preferences for
an initial value of the world capital stock k1 to the left of the world
steady state.
Let us recall that we have defined the stock of net foreign assets
held by residents of country i at the beginning of period t + 1 as
Ai,t+1 ≡ −Zi,t. We have already established that the United States
is the borrower country for any t ≥ 1.
Proposition 6 (The dynamics of net foreign assets) Under
Assumption 2, country 1 (the developed country) accumulates net
foreign liabilities as the world economy converges to the steady state.
Proof. In Appendix A, we show that equation (1.18) for country
1 becomes under Cobb-Douglas preferences:
z∗1,t = ρ2τ1
(
1− βαk
∗α−1
t+1 − δ − n
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
)
Therefore, using our definition of net foreign assets:
a∗1,t+1 = −
ρ2τ1
1 + n
(
1− βαk
∗α−1
t+1 − δ − n
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
)
Our goal is to study how a1,t+1 changes with kt+1:
∂a1,t+1
∂kt+1
=
ρ2τ1βα(α− 1)kα−2t+1
(1 + αkα−1t+1 − δ)2
Hypotheses 1 and 2 imply that the initial conditions of the autar-
kic economies are such that the initial capital stock of the world
economy (k∗1) is to the left of the world steady state. Given that
∂a1,t+1
∂kt+1
< 0, country 1’s net foreign liabilities increase as the capital
stock accumulates.
Proposition 3 established that the sign of country 1’s balance of
trade at a given t depends on whether the current and next period’s
interest rates are lower or bigger than n. It should now be evident
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that trade dynamics depends both on the initial conditions and the
long-run properties of the autarkic economies. By Proposition 2
and 4, we know already that country 1 will run a deficit in the
long-run. In the next proposition, we study the dynamics of trade
imbalances.
Proposition 7 (The dynamics of global imbalances) Under
Assumption 2, the balance of trade of country 1 deteriorates over
time.
Proof. The balance of trade of country 1 under log preferences is
(see Appendix A.2):
tb∗1,t = ρ2τ1
[
(1− β)αk
∗α−1
t − δ − n
1 + n
+ β
αk∗α−1t+1 − δ − n
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
]
The balance of trade of country 1 decreases with the current and
the future capital stock:
∂tb1,t
∂kt
=
ρ2τ1(1− β)α(α− 1)kα−2t
1 + n
< 0
∂tb1,t
∂kt+1
=
ρ2τ1βα(α− 1)kα−2t+1 (1 + n)
(1 + αkα−1t+1 − δ)2
< 0
As k∗1 < k
∗, the balance of trade of country 1 decreases as the cap-
ital stock converges to the world steady state.
We can now compare the time-series of the US current account
and net international position with the predictions of the model.
Figure 1.1 shows that the sign of the US current account varied
until the early 1990s, that is before the building up of global im-
balances. For this period, we cannot say anything more specific as
disaggregated data are not available before 1999. It is possible that
China might have imported from the United States in the early
stage of financial integration, as Proposition 5 suggests.
More importantly, Proposition 7 explains the widening of the
United States’ current account deficit versus China. Our model
seems to be more successful in capturing the dynamics of global
imbalances than other models, e.g. [2], [10], [49]. In these papers,
the United States run a trade deficit immediately after China’s
financial integration (or a shock), and then the deficit gradually
improves. Our framework is more consistent with the data as it
predicts the gradual deterioration of the US deficit.
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Another aspect of interest is the dynamics of US foreign assets.
Proposition 6 establishes that US net foreign liabilities accumulate
over time, starting from t > 1. Figure 1.4 shows this kind of pat-
tern. In this respect, the contribution of this chapter is to explain
why the US net foreign assets position turned negative before the
emergence of global imbalances.
Finally, we show that the data validate the hypothesis that there
is an excess of savings in the world economy. Let us focus on the
key equation of the model (equation 1.23). The model requires that
the interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy for the
developed country to run a trade deficit.
The first variable of interest, the real interest rate, is the most
controversial because the marginal product of capital and the inter-
est rate in the international bond market are indistinguishable in
the model. Figure 1.4 shows that the negative investment position
of the US is due to net external debt (private and public), which
has steadily increased and reached 40% of GDP in 2007. As it is
known, the difference between NFA and net external debt is due to
FDI and equity holdings, which tend to be positive for the US.
Because foreign lenders accumulate safe US assets, we take the
rate of interest on the US government bonds at different maturities
as a proxy for the real interest rate. Figure 1.4 indicates that while
interest rates were quite high in the early 1980s, they have embarked
on a negative trend since then.
As far as the growth part is concerned, we only allowed for pop-
ulation growth so far. Let us consider labor-augmenting technolog-
ical progress and assume that technology grows at a common rate
g in the two countries12. We show in the Appendix that equation
(1.23) becomes:
tˆb
∗
i ≈ −zˆ∗i
n+ g − r∗
1 + n+ g
(1.26)
where the hat denotes variables per effective worker. We now take
g = 0.03 as the (conservative) growth rate of technological progress
for the world economy (similarly to Caballero et al.) and n = 0.01
12As Gourinchas and Jeanne [36] observe, “that countries have the same growth rate in the
long run is a standard assumption, often justified by the fact that no country should have a
share of world GDP converging to 0 or 100 percent.”. The same would occur in this model
in the long-run.
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as the population growth rate (see footnote 3). Figure 1.5 reveals
that real interest rates have been far below the combined growth
rate of 4% since the 1990s. The gap between the two has particu-
larly widened during the last decade, which saw the emergence of
global imbalances.
We can conclude that there is evidence that the United States
have accumulated a trade deficit because a higher saving rate in
China (due to the absence of a pay-as-you-go system) has been
pushing the real interest rate below the long-run growth rate of the
world economy.
A final word is due about dynamic inefficiency. In our setup, we
assume that the US economy was at the golden rule before inte-
grating with “inefficient” countries. We have shown that the conse-
quence is that the integrated economy is overaccumulating capital.
Part of the literature is of the view that the capital overaccumu-
lation case is only of theoretical interest because actual economies
are not dynamically inefficient (see [25] for a discussion, p. 84).
These statements are often based on early tests on the dynamic
efficiency of stochastic OLG economies. However, Chattopadhyay
[16] has recently shown that a widely used criterion to test dynamic
efficiency, the net dividend criterion, does not actually give suffi-
cient conditions for optimality. While we are far from having an
empirically implementable test, the results of this chapter empha-
size that the capital overaccumulation case cannot be ignored since
it has something to tell us on relevant stylized facts such as global
imbalances.
1.4.1 Country size
In this section, we show that country size has an impact on capital
flows and current account dynamics.
First, we establish that the steady state capital stock of the
world economy is increasing in country 2’s size.
Proposition 8 Let k∗ρ2,ρ1 and k
∗
ρ˜2,ρ1
be the steady state capital stocks
of two economies, for which ρ˜2 > ρ2. Then, k
∗
ρ2,ρ1
< k∗ρ˜2,ρ1.
Proof. The logic of the proof is the same as for Proposition 4.
Consider equation (A.4) in the Appendix. In Lemma 1(ii), we have
proved that there exists a stable k∗ρ2,ρ1 such that g(k
∗
ρ2,ρ1
) = 0. Now
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consider another economy such that ρ˜2 > ρ2. It is straightforward
that if kρ˜2,ρ1 = kρ2,ρ1 , then g(kρ2,ρ1) < 0. Proposition 4 already
showed that the function g is increasing in k if the steady state is
stable. Hence, it must be true that k∗ρ˜2,ρ1 > kρ2,ρ1 for g(k
∗
ρ˜2,ρ1
) = 0.
This result shows that capital overaccumulation in the world
economy is intensified if country 2 has a bigger size. The implica-
tions for trade are the following. First, the higher is ρ2 the larger
is z∗1,t or country 1’s net foreign assets per capita (equation 1.19).
Together with the fact that n−r
∗
1+n
is also bigger, global imbalances
are also larger (equation 1.23).
It might be argued that ρˆ2 is a better measure for country size
(see Appendix A.3). Under technological progress, country i’s share
of world savings depends on country i’s share of total labour pro-
ductivity, as well as on population size. While China has a bigger
population, the technological level of the US is higher13. Using the
fact that
Y ∗t
LtAt
≡ yˆ∗t = yˆ∗i,t ≡
Y ∗i,t
Li,tAi,t
, we can rewrite ρˆi as follows:
ρˆi =
Li,tAi,t
LtAt
=
Y ∗i,t
Y ∗t
We compute East Asian countries’ share of total GDP, where total
GDP is computed as the sum of the US and East Asian countries
GDP14. As expected, the US have a bigger size since the “produc-
tivity gap” compensates for China’s bigger population: the size of
emerging countries varies between 21% in 1980 up to 50% in 201015.
The model cannot account for the fact that East Asia’s share has in-
creased over time due to its spectacular economic growth, because
ρˆ2 is constant in the model. A constant ρˆi is in fact the conse-
quence of assuming identical growth rates for the two countries16.
Yet, Proposition 8 can explain why capital flows and current ac-
count imbalances towards East Asian countries have a huge impact
13As a matter of fact, a simple way to account for the fact that China is poorer than the
US is to assume that A2,0 < A1,0. We thank Antonia Dı´az and Timothy Kehoe for having
raised this point.
14In particular, East Asian countries include China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and
Singapore. We take the countries’ PPP-converted GDP, at current prices from Heston A.,
Summers R., Aten B., Penn World Table Version 7.1, Center for International Comparisons
of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, July 2012.
15In the Penn World Tables, there are two sets of data for China due to measurement
problems. The above numbers are for China’s version 2. For China version 1, the shares
would be 15% in 1980 and 48% in 2010.
16See footnote 12 for a comment on this.
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on the US economy: if China was a small country, the US current
account deficit and net foreign asset liabilities would be negligible.
1.5 Conclusions and policy implications
This chapter takes seriously Bernanke’s hypothesis that global im-
balances might be due to a global saving glut. We have constructed
a model in which a global excess of savings arises because of the
financial integration between the United States and dynamically
inefficient economies, which have a higher propensity to save than
the US because they do not have a pay-as-you-go pension system.
The increase in world savings had as long-run effects the drop of
real interest rates and the emergence of global imbalances. These
and other empirical evidences can be read through the lens of this
model.
The model indicates that both the current direction of trade and
the low real interest rates are signals that the world economy is on
an inefficient path. If that was not the case, United States’ current
account should be zero or in surplus and we should also observe
much higher interest rates. Pension reforms in China in the direc-
tion of introducing a pay-as-you-go system would increase domestic
demand and therefore reduce world savings. The US deficit towards
China would shrink, which is the outcome that many politicians and
economists seem to hope for.
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Figure 1.1: Current accounts of the United States and China
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Figure 1.2: Gross national savings
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Figure 1.3: Capital accumulation in the world economy under Cobb-Douglas
utility and production functions
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Figure 1.4: United States’ net international position
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Net Debt Assets/GDP Net Foreign Assets/GDP
Sources: Lane and Milesi−Ferretti’s database (updated to 2007).
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Figure 1.5: Real interest rates in the United States
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Chapter 2
Technological differences
and trade dynamics in a
two-country world
2.1 Introduction
In neoclassical growth models, capital flows to the country whose
marginal product of capital is higher. Since developing countries
have a relatively low capital stock per capita, the marginal product
of capital is higher than in developed countries. Therefore, capital
should flow to those countries by the law of diminishing marginal
returns. In the model studied in Chapter 1, when financial markets
integrate, capital flows to the emerging country provided that the
country’s initial capital stock is sufficiently low. In the following
periods, as the emerging country does not have a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem, its young agents save relatively more to finance consumption
when old and therefore capital flows to the developed country.
After this initial adjustment, the model predicts that both coun-
tries have the same path of capital stock per capita. If the theory
was right in this respect, there should be no output differences
between the United States and East Asian countries. So why do
these differences persist, despite the increasing integration of finan-
cial markets? Explaining cross-country income inequality remains
an open and very challenging question1.
1The literature often refers to income differences, since the problem is thought of in
a closed economy framework where output and income are identical (see [11]). In open
economy, income and output do not coincide if there is asset trade among countries. Our
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In Chapter 1, we have allowed for initial levels of the labour-
augmenting technology to be different across countries2. Under
that specification, output per effective worker is equalized but not
output per capita. This is a convenient way to introduce output
differences, but it is only a scale effect.
In a one-good economy with constant returns to scale and perfect
competition, capital stocks per capita are equalized across countries
as an implication of assuming that aggregate production functions
are identical. The main objective of this Chapter is to relax this
assumption and study capital accumulation and trade when pro-
duction functions are heterogenous. In such framework, this means
allowing for income shares to be different across countries.
Earlier studies had suggested that capital shares decrease at
higher stages of development (see Bernanke et al. [7]). Gollin [24]
challenged this view and argued that the share of capital income
tends to be overestimated in developing countries, since income
from self-employment is wrongly considered as capital income. Ac-
cording to Gollin, in those countries most of GDP is generated
by self-employed workers in the agricultural sector, whose income
should rather be treated as labour income. Gollin then estimated
that adjusted capital shares vary between 0.20 and 0.35. He con-
cluded that although there is some variation of income shares across
countries, this is not as huge as it was previously thought. However,
Young [64] found that in China the average capital share across sec-
tors is 0.40, while it varies between 0.46 and 0.50 in the work of Bai
et al. [4]3. Therefore, these papers suggest that the capital share in
the aggregate production function of China is significantly higher
than the United States’, which is estimated to be around 1/3.
In principle, it is hard to explain why capital shares should be
different between these two countries and more generally across
countries. On the other hand, the empirical literature suggests
that the heterogeneity in income shares is potentially relevant for
our case of interest. Our approach is to take this fact as exogenous
and explore whether it can explain why the integration of financial
focus will be on differences in output per capita.
2See Appendix A.3.
3Young argued that there are no accountancy problems in China for at least two reasons.
First, self-employment in China is quite rare. Secondly, the Chinese national accounts directly
assume that the income of the self-employed is labour income.
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markets has not meant the disappearance of GDP inequality be-
tween the United States and China. Our purpose is not to draw
general conclusions on the relationship between the share of cap-
ital and income per capita, since no robust correlation has been
found between capital shares and GDP per capita (e.g. [24], [7]
and [12]). The alternative, traditional view is that income inequal-
ity is due to frictions in international capital markets. While it is
true that capital controls in some emerging countries are still in
place, there is also evidence that marginal products of capital are
equalized across countries (see Caselli et al. [12]). These recent
findings are supportive of the hypothesis that capital markets are
substantially integrated and therefore calls for other causes to be
found. The objectives of this Chapter are twofold. The first is to
contribute to the theory of capital flows, since a two-country model
with heterogeneous income shares has not been studied before. The
second aim is to reassess the conclusions of the previous Chapter
when this additional element of heterogeneity is introduced.
To start with, we abstract from the heterogeneity in the pension
systems and we analyze the pattern of trade between two coun-
tries whose production functions have different capital shares. In
a Cobb-Douglas setting, the country with the lowest capital share
(i.e. the developed country) is more productive in the sense that it
can produce more units of output given the same input. In equi-
librium, the developed country’s output per capita is always higher
than in the developing country, so are wages. Yet, the young in the
developed country lend to firms in the developing country. They do
not find convenient to invest all their savings in the domestic firms,
because of the decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, capital flows
to the developing country, but output differences persist despite
the absence of frictions in the world capital market. Yet, output
differences at the world steady state are reduced as compared to
autarky.
Second, we introduce the pension system in the developed coun-
try and ask what is the pattern of trade when countries are het-
erogenous both in their saving rates and technologies. We find that
we cannot make strong predictions on the pattern of capital flows.
The lower capital share induces capital outflows from the developed
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country, while the pension system has the opposite effect. Going
back to our case study, the United States’ net foreign asset position
is negative in the data. Therefore, our conclusion is that the “saving
channel” must be more important than the “technology channel”.
Third, we ask what would happen to global imbalances if emerg-
ing countries introduced a pension system. For simplicity, suppose
that the lump-sum tax is of the same size as in the US. If capital
shares were the same, there would be no trade at impact. In fact,
countries start with the same initial conditions and their savings
become identical. The world economy would converge to a steady
state with a lower capital stock per capita4, but there would be no
trade both along the transition path and at steady state. Global
imbalances would basically disappear5.
Since the capital shares are different, the pattern of trade would
be reversed since capital would now flow to the developing country.
Under Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 1, the world economy converges to a
steady state at which the interest rate is higher than the population
growth rate. As far as trade imbalances are concerned, the devel-
oped country would still run a trade deficit in the long-run, despite
that the country becomes the international lender. Our conclusion
is that global imbalances would not vanish if China introduced a
pension system, because of the heterogeneity in the income shares.
2.2 A two-country model with heterogenous cap-
ital shares
The set up is a two-country Diamond model in which the two coun-
tries have access to different CRS technologies for the production
of the consumption good. First, we need the following definition:
Definition 4 (Productivity) Given two technologies 1 and 2, we
say that technology 1 is more productive than technology 2 if f1(k) >
f2(k) for any k.
We then assume:
4Under Hypothesis 1, the new world steady state would be the golden rule.
5If the pension system was smaller in the emerging country, global imbalances would be
reduced.
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Assumption 3 Country 1 & 2 have Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions and α1 < α2.
Under Assumption 3, country 1’s technology produces more output
than country 2’s technology as long as k < 1 (see Figure 2.1). When
both the production functions and the utility functions are Cobb-
Douglas, the steady state capital stock is less than one (see equation
(2.5) below). Therefore, we concentrate our analysis in the region
0 6 ki < 1 for every i.
We assume that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas to avoid
multiplicity of steady states. For simplicity, we also assume that
δ = 1. For the moment, we abstract from other bases of trade,
namely differences in social security systems, to isolate the effect of
heterogenous technologies on capital flows. In the next section, we
shall reintroduce the pay-as-you-go system in country 1.
2.2.1 Autarky
First, consider the two economies in autarky as this will be useful
to analyze the open economy. For the moment, suppose that both
capital and labour are immobile.
From profit maximization, factor prices in country i are:
ri,t = αik
αi−1
i,t (2.1)
wi,t = (1− αi)kαii,t (2.2)
With Cobb-Douglas utility function and τ1 = τ2 = 0, the saving
function of country i is6:
si,t = (1− β)wi,t (2.3)
where 1− β is the weight attached to consumption when old. The
dynamics of the capital stock per capita of country i is characterized
by the following equation:
(1 + n)kauti,t+1 = (1− β)(1− αi)kauti,t αi i = {1, 2} (2.4)
It is known that a unique and stable steady state exists under these
assumptions on preferences and technology. The steady state cap-
6See section A.2 in the Appendix A.2.
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ital stocks and interest rates in autarky are:
kauti =
[
(1− β)(1− αi)
1 + n
] 1
1−αi
(2.5)
rauti =
αi(1 + n)
(1− β)(1− αi) (2.6)
We can now prove that the first result:
Proposition 9 (Autarkic steady states) (i) The capital stock
per capita of the country with the lower share of capital is higher
at the autarkic steady state: kaut1 > k
aut
2 . (ii) The interest rate of
the country with the lower share of capital is lower at the autarkic
steady state: raut1 < r
aut
2 .
Proof. (i) To show this, we compute the derivative of k with
respect to α using equation (2.5):
∂k
∂α
=
[
(1− β)(1− α)
1 + n
] 1
1−α
· 1
(1− α)2 ·
[
log
(
(1− β)(1− α)
1 + n
)
− 1
]
Since (1− β)(1− α)/(1 + n) < 1, then ∂k
∂α
< 0.
(ii) The derivative of r with respect to α is (see equation (2.6)):
∂r
∂α
=
1 + n
(1− β)(1− α)2 > 0
Since country 1 produces more than country 2 given the same
input, kaut1 > k
aut
2 imply that y
aut
1 > y
aut
2 . If the two countries do
not open to trade, country 1 has a higher output per capita than
country 2 at the autarkic steady state. Therefore, country 1 (2)
can be thought of as the developed (developing) country.
2.2.2 Open economy
In this section, there is a common capital market and countries are
allowed to trade. Since there are no frictions, all firms take the
same interest rate as given. The demands for inputs in the two
countries now satisfy:
rt = α1k
α1−1
1,t = α2k
α2−1
2,t (2.7)
wi,t = (1− αi)kαii,t (2.8)
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For any rt, we must have that k1,t 6= k2,t and y1,t 6= y2,t as the
capital shares are not identical. Differently from Chapter 1, there
is no wage equalization.
The saving function of country i is the same as in autarky (equa-
tion (2.3)).
We can now write the equilibrium equation and analyze capital
accumulation as well as the pattern of trade. The (world) capital
market is in equilibrium as long as (world) savings are equal to the
sum of the domestic capital stocks:
∑
i
K∗i,t+1 =
∑
i
s∗i,t = (1− β)
∑
i
Li,t(1− αi)k∗αii,t t > 0 (2.9)
Dividing by the world population Lt, the equation becomes:
ρ1k
∗
1,t+1 + ρ2k
∗
2,t+1 =
1− β
1 + n
[
ρ1(1− α1)k∗α11,t + ρ2(1− α2)k∗α22,t
]
(2.10)
where ρi is country i’s share of the world population. We are at a
steady state of the world economy when the capital stocks of the
two countries do not change over time:
ρ1k
∗
1 + ρ2k
∗
2 =
1− β
1 + n
[ρ1(1− α1)k∗α11 + ρ2(1− α2)k∗α22 ] (2.11)
To prove the existence of a steady state, we rewrite the difference
equation using the first-order conditions of the firms and show the
existence of a steady state interest rate.
Proposition 10 (Existence of steady states) For any given r0,
the (world) interest rate converges to a unique and stable steady
state r∗.
Proof. First, let us rewrite (2.10) using rt = αik
αi−1
i,t :∑
i
ρi
(
r∗t+1
αi
) 1
αi−1
=
1− β
1 + n
[∑
i
ρi(1− αi)
(
r∗t
αi
) αi
αi−1
]
Using the implicit function theorem, we find that:
drt+1
drt
(rt) =
1−β
1+n
[∑
i ρi
(
rt
αi
) 1
αi−1
]
∑
i
ρi
αi(1−αi)
(
rt+1
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
> 0 ∀ rt (2.12)
Since the derivative exists, we can write rt+1 = φ(rt). The difference
equation is an increasing function, with φ(0) = 0. It can also be
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checked that limrt→0 φ
′(rt) = ∞ and limrt→∞ φ′(rt) = 0. These
conditions imply that a stable steady state exists. Moreover, we
have that φ′′(rt) < 0. Concavity of the φ function means that the
steady state is unique (see Galor et al. [30]).
Corollary 1 The capital stock per capita of country i accumu-
lates according to the following equation: ki,t+1 =
(
φ(αik
α−1
i,t )
αi
) 1
αi−1
.
Moreover,
∂ki,t+1
∂ki,t
> 0 and
∂2ki,t+1
(∂ki,t)2
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Suppose that r0 > r
∗. By the function φ, the world interest rate
falls until it reaches the steady state interest rate. Since capital
stocks per capita decrease with the interest rate, the domestic cap-
ital stocks accumulate over time and converge to the steady state
capital stocks k∗1 and k
∗
2. We can now study the pattern of trade in
the capital market at the steady state:
Proposition 11 (Borrowing and lending at steady state) Country
1 (2) is the lender (borrower) country at the world interest rate r∗,
which lies between the two autarkic steady states: raut1 < r
∗ < raut2 .
Proof. First, let us consider country i’s excess demand per capita:
zi(r) ≡ (1 + n)
(
r
αi
) 1
αi−1 − (1− β)(1− αi)
(
r
αi
) αi
αi−1
(2.13)
Suppose that zi(r
∗) > 0 for some i. By directly manipulating the
above equation, it turns out that is true only as long as rauti > r
∗.
Similarly, zi(r
∗) < 0 if r∗ > rauti .
The world interest rate cannot satisfy rauti > r∗ for every i. Oth-
erwise, we would have that zi(r
∗) > 0 for every i and
∑
i zi(r
∗) > 0,
since raut1 6= raut2 by assumption. For the same reason, r∗ > rauti for
every i is impossible. In order for r∗ to clear the world capital
market, the only possibility is that raut1 < r
∗ < raut2 . Hence, at the
world steady state, z2(r
∗) > 0 and z1(r∗) < 0.
Corollary 2 The steady state output per capita of country 1 (2) in
open economy is lower (higher) than in autarky.
Financial openness allows the developing country to reach a
higher output per capita and a higher wage as compared to the
autarkic steady state.
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Nonetheless, the model implies that there is no actual conver-
gence of GDP per capita across countries, even though inequality
is reduced with financial integration.
Proposition 12 (GDP inequality) If 1+n
(1−α1)(1−β) >
(
α2
α1
)α2(1−α1)
α2−α1 ,
then y1,t > y2,t for all rt ≥ r∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proposition applies if the initial condition of the world econ-
omy satisfies r0 ≥ r∗, i.e. the capital stocks per capita of the two
countries are below their steady state values. In this case, country
1 is richer than country 2 both in the transition path to the world
steady state and at steady state.
Note the above condition is not very stringent. On the one hand,
it is known that α1 = 1/3. Young [64] and Bai et al. [4] estimated
that the capital share for China is between 0.40 and 0.50. Since we
do not want this condition to be sensitive on other parameters, we
assume no discounting and no population growth: 1− β = 0.5 and
n = 0. For α2 = 0.40, the inequality is satisfied since 3 > 2.0736.
Similarly, 3 > 2.25 for α2 = 0.50.
Corollary 3 In open economy, wages and savings in country 1 are
higher than in country 27.
Proof. Recalling that wi,t = (1 − αi)kαii,t , we must have that
w1,t > w2,t given that y1,t > y2,t and the share of labour in country
1 is higher. Since β is identical across countries, the second part
follows.
We can now study trade dynamics in detail. First, we need
to make some assumptions on the two countries’ initial conditions
when they open to trade at t = 0.
Assumption 4 At t = 0, k1,0 = k
aut
1 and k2,0 < k
aut
2 .
As in Chapter 1, we look at the case in which the marginal prod-
uct of capital in the developing country (country 2) is higher than
7In this chapter, wages are not equalized when countries open to trade because of the
heterogenous technologies. Therefore, the assumption that labour markets are closed matters
as far as the world equilibrium is concerned. If labour migration was allowed, there would
be incentives for workers to move to country 1 until the wage differential disappears. We
abstract from this issue as our focus is to study the pattern of trade in the capital market.
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in the developed country (country 1) at the openness. We assume
that the developed country is at its autarkic steady state level of
capital, while the developing country is still along its transition
path to the autarkic steady state.
It follows from these assumptions that s1,0 > s2,0. We must then
find the interest rate r∗1 which clears the world capital market in the
initial period. After that, we can analyze the direction of capital
flows at t = 0.
To start with, we need the following definitions. Given k1,0, r
aut
1,1
is the interest rate which country 1 would face if it did not open to
trade with country 2. Since k1,0 = k
aut
1 , then r
aut
1,1 = r
aut
1 . Similarly,
given k2,0, r
aut
2,1 would be the interest rate prevailing in country 2 if
still in autarky.
Lemma 3 (World interest rate at t = 1) Given Assumption 4,
raut2,1 > r
∗
1 > r
aut
1 .
Proof. First, let us prove by contradiction that r∗1 6= raut2,1 , where
raut2,1 is the interest rate which would clear the (domestic) capital
market of country 2 if the country remained in autarky. If r∗1 = r
aut
2,1 ,
then the young in country 2 would not actually trade even if they
are allowed to do so. Since savings are given, the demand for capital
would be the same in autarky: s2,0 = k2,1(1 +n), where k2,1 = k
aut
2,1 .
In country 1, the demand for capital would be lower than in autarky
as raut2,1 > r
aut
2 > r
aut
1 . Therefore, k1,1(1 + n) < s1,0. But then, the
world capital market does not clear since (1 + n)
∑
i ki,1 <
∑
i si,0.
Similarly, it can be proved that r∗1 6= raut1 as the aggregate de-
mand for capital would exceed aggregate savings. In the initial
period, each country’s savings are given. Since the demand for
capital is decreasing in r, it must be that raut2,1 > r
∗
1 > r
aut
1 in order
for
∑
i zi(r
∗
1) = 0 to be satisfied.
Proposition 13 (Financial integration) At t = 0, the develop-
ing country borrows from the developed country.
Proof. Lemma 3 established that r∗1 < r
aut
2,1 . Then, k
∗
2,1(1+n) > s2,0
and therefore z∗2,0 > 0.
The next step is to analyse the pattern of trade along the tran-
sition to the steady state.
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Intuition suggests that capital should flow to the developing
country even during the transition. The developing country, be-
cause of its lower savings, should have a higher marginal product
of capital. While it is true that country 1’s technology is more pro-
ductive, decreasing returns to scale should provide an incentive to
export capital to the developing country. Our strategy for the proof
is similar to Lemma 3. In each period, we can take the interest rate
r∗t as given and ask which country has a higher marginal product
of capital, i.e. the interest rate which would prevail if the countries
were in autarky in period t+ 1.
Lemma 4 Given r∗1 > r
∗, then raut2,t+1 > r
∗
t+1 > r
aut
1,t+1 for every r
∗
t .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 14 (Borrowing and lending during the transition)
The developed country lends for any t > 1.
Proof. The proof follows from the previous lemma. Let us define
the excess demand function of country i along the transition:
zi(r
∗
t , r
∗
t+1) ≡
(
r∗t+1
αi
) 1
αi−1 − (1− β)(1− αi)
1 + n
(
r∗t
αi
) αi
αi−1
For country 1, we have that r∗t+1 > r
aut
1,t+1. Then, (1 +n)k
∗
1,t+1 < s
∗
1,t
or z1(r
∗
t , r
∗
t+1) < 0. On the other hand, country 2 will have excess
demand for capital, i.e. z2(r
∗
t , r
∗
t+1) > 0.
2.3 The pattern of trade with heterogenous tech-
nologies and pension systems
In section 2, we found that capital flows to the country with the
least productive technology, i.e. the developing country.
We now reintroduce the pay-as-you-go system in country 1. The
purpose is to check whether or under which conditions the results
of Chapter 1 are robust when we relax the assumption of identical
technologies. Given the analysis above, it should be evident that
there are two basis for trade which force capital flows in opposite
directions. On the one hand, the emerging country saves more
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than the other country because of the absence of the pay-as-you-
go system and therefore it has incentives to lend to the developed
country. On the other hand, capital should flow to the emerging
country since its marginal product of capital is higher. As a result,
the theoretical model cannot give a clean prediction on the direction
of capital flows. Since capital actually flows to the United States,
it must be that there are some restrictions in the model such that
the “saving motive” prevails. In particular, this is true under the
condition that the autarkic interest rate of the developing country
is higher than the interest rate of the other country.
Assumption 5 The autarkic steady states satisfy rautss1 > r
aut
2 .
This assumption implies that the size of pay-as-you-go system
in country 1 is big enough to neutralize the difference in the pro-
duction technologies, or that technological differences are small (see
Figure 2.2)8.
The world capital market clearing condition is now the following:
(1 + n)
∑
i
ρik
∗
i,t+1 = ρ1(1− β)[(1− α1)k∗α11,t − τ1]− (2.14)
− ρ1τ1 β(1 + n)
1 + α1k
∗α1−1
1,t+1
+ ρ2(1− β)(1− α2)k∗α22,t
or:
(1 + n)
∑
i
ρi
(
r∗t+1
αi
) 1
αi−1
= (1− β)
∑
i
ρi(1− αi)
(
r∗t
αi
) αi
αi−1 −
− ρ1τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + r∗t+1
]
(2.15)
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 5, a stable steady state exists.
Proof. A discussion on the conditions under which a world stable
steady state exists when τ1 > 0 and αi = α are provided in section
A.2. The crucial point was that the size of the pension system in
country 1 has to be small enough in order for savings to be positive.
Changing the α parameter in country 2 does not pose any additional
problems, so the same arguments can be used here.
8We refer to section A.2 of Chapter 1 for an analysis of country 1’s autarkic dynamical
system with τ1 > 0 (it is enough to impose that ρ1 = 1). Note that since there is no closed
form solution for rautss1 , we cannot derive a condition on the parameters of the economy such
that Assumption 5 holds.
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Let’s refer to the stable steady state of this economy as r¯∗. Since
the autarkic interest rate of country 1 does not have a closed form
solution, we cannot use the arguments of section 2.2 to study the
pattern of trade. Moreover, we cannot follow the logic of the proof
of Proposition 1.4, since it relied on the equalization of the capital
stocks. The following proofs are only sketched.
Lemma 6 Under Assumption 5, the steady state interest rate lie
between the two autarkic interest rates.
Proof. Consider the economy of Chapter 1, where τ1 > 0 and
αi = α. In that case, we showed that r
autss
1 > r
aut
2 . Next, allow
for α2 > α1. Remember that Assumption 5 is satisfied only as long
as α2 is sufficiently close to α1. See Figure 2.2 for an illustration.
Since the autarkic interest rate of country 2 has increased, the world
interest rate should be higher than in the case with identical capital
shares. However, it is still the case that rautss1 > r¯
∗ > raut2 .
Proposition 15 Under Assumption 5, capital flows to the devel-
oped country at the steady state.
Proof. The excess demand function of country 2 is the same as
in section 2.2. From Proposition 11, we know that z2(r¯
∗) < 0 if
raut2 < r¯
∗ and viceversa. Given Lemma 6, we can establish that
z2(r¯
∗) < 0. Therefore, capital flows to the developed country under
Assumption 5.
Figures 2.3 illustrates the dynamics of the capital stocks in the
two countries when there is no social security in country 1 (see
Corollary 1). The steady state capital stocks satisfy k∗1 < k
aut
1 and
k∗2 > k
aut
2 since r
aut
2 > r
∗ > raut1 . If we introduce the social security
system in country 1, its autarkic difference equation shifts below
the autarkic difference equation of country 2 provided that τ1 is big
enough (see Figure 2.4). In that case, we have that rautss1 > r¯
∗ >
raut2 and, therefore, k¯
∗
1 > k
aut
1 and k¯
∗
2 < k
aut
2 .
2.4 The introduction of a pay-as-you-go system
in emerging countries and global imbalances
Finally, we want to ask the following question: “Would global im-
balances disappear if emerging countries introduced a pay-as-you-go
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system?”
To start with, it is important to stress that the basic equation of
the balance of trade does not change across different versions of the
model, as it can be obtained by manipulating the market clearing
equation for the good (see Chapter 1):
tb∗i,t = −z∗i,t +
1 + r∗t
1 + n
z∗i,t−1
so that at the steady state:
tb∗i = −z∗i
(
n− r∗
1 + n
)
We approach this question in two steps. Firstly, we analyse the case
in which countries have identical capital shares and then introduce
technological differences.
2.4.1 Identical capital shares
We still work under the hypothesis that country 1’s autarkic steady
state is the golden rule (Hypothesis 1). In Chapter 1, we have shown
that since rautss1 > r
∗ > raut2 , then the world economy’s interest rate
is lower than the population growth rate.
Suppose that country 2 introduces a pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem at t∗. For simplicity, assume that τ1 = τ2 = τ . The world
capital market clearing equation now becomes:
(1 + n)kt+1 = (1− β)[(1− α)kαt − τ ]− τ
β(1 + n)
1 + αkα−1t+1
t > t∗
Note also that both countries have the same “initial condition” at
t∗ because of the identical technologies.
The steady state interest rate is precisely equal to the autarkic
interest rate of country 1, which is at the golden rule. We denote
this new steady state as r∗∗. If the world economy is at the old
steady state at t∗, since k∗ > k∗∗ the capital stock per capita is
outside steady state and will converge to the new steady state from
above. If the world economy is not at the old steady state and
kt∗ > k
∗∗, there will be a similar adjustment process. If kt∗ < k∗∗
capital would instead converge from below.
Independently from the initial condition, for t > t∗ the two coun-
tries’ savings would be identical and therefore there would be no
trade in the capital market. In the first period, that zi,t∗ = 0 implies
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that tb1,t∗ > 0 (since z1,t∗−1 > 0). Country 1 has a trade surplus
since it repays the previous period’s loan to country 2. However,
for every t > t∗ we have tbi,t = 0. The introduction of a pension
system of the same size would mean the permanent disappearance
of global imbalances.
Instead, if the emerging country introduced a smaller pay-as-
you-go system, so that τ2 < τ1, it is intuitive that capital would
keep flowing to the developed country and that the latter would
still run a trade deficit in the long run. However, the size of global
imbalances would be smaller.
2.4.2 Heterogenous capital shares
Let’s now allow for country 2’s capital share to be higher than in
country 1. Since we claimed that the difference in the capital shares
is sufficiently small (Assumption 5), at the outset we still have that
n > r¯∗ under Hypothesis 1.
If the emerging country introduces a pension system of the same
size of country 1 at t∗, the world capital market clearing equation
becomes:
(1 + n)
∑
i
ρiki,t+1 = (1− β)
∑
i
ρi[(1− αi)kαii,t − τ ]−
− βτ(1 + n)
∑
i
ρi
1
1 + αik
αi−1
i,t+1
t > t∗
The first observation is that countries start with different “initial
conditions” at t∗, since y1,t∗ > y2,t∗ (see Proposition 12). As in the
case with identical α, the effect of the pension system in country 2
is that r¯∗∗ > r¯∗. Therefore, the economy will converge to a steady
state with a higher interest rate.
However, there would still be trade since technologies are differ-
ent. We have shown that capital flows to the developing country
in the long-run, so the pattern of trade would be reversed. At the
new world steady state, we would have that z¯∗∗1 < 0. Moreover, r¯
∗∗
would not be at the golden rule as in the case with identical capital
shares, but to its left: r¯∗∗ > n. Therefore, country 1 would still
run a trade deficit in the long-run. However, since we argued that
the difference in technologies is small, these imbalances would not
be as large as the ones induced by the heterogeneity in the pension
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systems.
2.5 Conclusions and future research
In this Chapter, we have studied a model in which countries are
heterogeneous in their aggregate production functions. We have
shown that the integration of financial markets does not imply the
equalization of GDP per capita across countries, even though cap-
ital flows to the developing country. The model is a way to think
about GDP inequalities in a setting of frictionless capital markets.
We have also showed that the pattern of capital flows would
be reversed if China introduced a pay-as-you-go system, because
of technological differences between China and the United States.
Capital would flow to the country where the marginal product of
capital is higher, which is the emerging economy because of its
higher capital share. The United States would run a surplus or
a deficit depending on where the new steady state interest rate
would be as compared to the golden rule allocation. Therefore, we
argued that global imbalances would not vanish if China pursed
some pension reforms.
Finally, it is true that the United States are net borrowers but
they also have a positive FDI position against the rest of the world
(Figure 1.5). The data might reflect the fact that while emerging
countries are net lenders because of a saving motive, the US invest
more in emerging countries than viceversa since there are invest-
ment opportunities in emerging countries offering higher returns.
This can explain the ambiguity in the pattern of trade when both
sources of heterogeneity are present.
As a matter of fact, there is only one asset in the model and
it is not possible to distinguish and explain the pattern of capital
flows at a more disaggregated level. The next step towards a better
understanding of gross capital flows requires the introduction of a
menu of assets yielding different rates of return, which requires a
model with uncertainty. We leave this task for future research.
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Figure 2.1: Cobb-Douglas production functions with α2 > α1.
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Figure 2.3: Capital accumulation with α2 > α1 and no social security in country
1
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Figure 2.4: Capital accumulation with α2 > α1 and social security in country
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Part II
A theory of exchange rate
determination
62
Chapter 3
Portfolio choice and
nominal exchange rate
determination in a
stochastic OLG economy
3.1 Introduction
Since data on countries’ gross foreign assets positions have been
made available in the last decade, one of the main issues on the
agenda of international macroeconomists is the understanding of
countries’ portfolio choices1. However, as Gourinchas and Rey [38]
put it, “the open economy literature has so far not managed to come
up with a new generation of portfolio balance models microfounded
and embedded in a general equilibrium set up.”. The purpose of
this chapter is to develop a general equilibrium framework with
incomplete financial markets and nominal assets in which countries’
portfolios choices can be studied.
The dynamics of the net foreign assets position of a country is
driven by two main forces, i.e. portfolio adjustments and changes
in the value of assets and liabilities. For us to be able to interpret
the data, it is therefore essential to come up with a model in which
portfolio rebalancing takes place. In models with complete mar-
kets, i.e. the Lucas asset pricing model, it is always optimal not
1Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [41], [43] pioneered the empirical work on the topic and provided
a unique database in terms of country coverage and level of asset disaggregation.
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to retrade assets following a new realization of uncertainty2. This
framework was extended by Lucas [44] to incorporate money. How-
ever, the flexible exchange rates’ equilibrium allocation is shown to
be equivalent to the barter allocation and is supported by constant
holdings of money balances, as well as of Lucas trees. While it is
reasonable to conjecture that relaxing the assumption of complete
markets might be the crucial step to improve our understanding of
countries’ portfolio choices, the lack of tractability is a major issue
when markets are allowed to be incomplete.
Recent work has proposed local solution methods to analyze
incomplete markets’ models (e.g. Devereux et al. [20] and Tille et
al. [63]). The advantage of these methods is that they can deal
with any state space. On the other hand, Rabitsch et al. [54]
have questioned their accuracy and showed that the global solution
does not always coincide with the local one3. Pavlova and Rigobon
[51] were able to derive closed form solutions under log utility, but
uncertainty in the endowments is not enough to generate time-
varying portfolios. The common element of this strand of literature
is the focus on incomplete markets’ models with real assets.
The novelty of this work is that we investigate the role of the
nominal exchange rate in countries’ saving and portfolio decisions.
In real life, assets are currency-denominated and intuition suggests
that the nominal exchange rate matters when agents face the prob-
lem of allocating their savings across domestic and foreign issued
assets.
If we hope to understand the behaviour of the exchange rate
as well as of countries’ portfolios as seen in the data, it is impor-
tant to have a model in which these variables can be pinned down.
However, the incomplete markets’ literature has pointed out that
this task is particularly daunting when nominal assets are traded.
In a two-period economy, Balasko and Cass [5] and Geanakoplos
and Mas-Colell [31] have shown that the equilibrium allocation is
indeterminate when markets are incomplete.
The OLG model is a suitable approach to study portfolio choices
with nominal assets, since stochastic stationary equilibria are known
to be determinate when markets are incomplete as long as money is
2See Lucas [44] and Judd et al. [40]. for a more general version of the model.
3See also Courdacier et al. [18] for a critical assessment of local solution methods.
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held as one of the assets (Cass et al. [13], Gottardi [35]). Our asset
structure is going to be very simple: currencies are the only assets
available for trade. This allows to derive some analytical results
where possible, which facilitates the understanding of the model.
The seminal paper on the OLG model with multiple currencies
is Kareken and Wallace [39]. They analyze a one-good economy
in which there are no legal restrictions in currency trading, in the
sense that each currency can be used to buy the consumption good
in any location4. One of their key findings is that the equilibrium
exchange rate is indeterminate. The indeterminacy is related to
the perfect substitutability of currencies from the point of view
of the agents, since their rates of return are equalized. For the
same reason, portfolios cannot be pinned down since agents are
indifferent as to how allocate their saving across the currencies.
Another important implication of the rate of returns’ equalization
is that the exchange rate is constant over time. These results are
due to the assumption of no legal restrictions and are not related
to the OLG structure of the economy5.
Our solution to these problems is to work under the assumption
that each currency can only buy the country specific good. The
idea of distinguishing commodities by their location goes back to
Debreu [19]: “A good at a certain location and the same good at
another location are different economic objects, and the specifica-
tion of the location at which it will be available is essential.”...“A
commodity is therefore defined by a specification of all its phys-
ical characteristics, of its availability date, and of its availability
location. As soon as one of these three factors changes, a differ-
ent commodity results.”. The assumption that the endowment of a
country can only be bought by the local currency has been adopted
by the cash-in-advance literature started by Lucas [44].
This assumption turns out to be crucial in a number of respects.
Firstly, it allows to pin down portfolios and the exchange rate. Sec-
ond, a stationary equilibrium would not exist otherwise. This is
related to earlier work of Spear [62], who showed that steady state
4Their approach has been followed by Fischer [23] and Manuelli and Peck [48]. Fischer
has extended Kareken and Wallance’s results with L goods. Manuelli and Peck have looked
at the issue of exchange rate volatility under uncertainty.
5Sargent [59] showed that the same indeterminacy result holds when agents are infinitely
lived.
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equilibrium does not generically exist in pure exchange stochas-
tic OLG economies with multiple goods. By introducing “cash-in-
advance” constraints, we are able to get existence for functional
forms of the utility functions widely used in macroeconomics6.
Under log utility and zero endowment in the second period of
life, the equilibrium system of equations is linear and it is possible
to compute the equilibrium prices and the allocation analytically.
While extremely useful, this example is very special as the exchange
rate and portfolios happen to be constant in equilibrium. As soon
as we generalize to isoelastic utility functions, the model does not
have closed-form solutions but demand functions can be computed.
When utility functions are identical, some analytical results can be
derived but equilibrium has to be computed numerically.
The first result of the chapter is that the model is able to gener-
ate state-varying portfolios, even under identical homothetic pref-
erences. We show that countries’ portfolio holdings in a given
state depend on the current distribution of wealth among countries.
Except for degenerate values of the endowments, the equilibrium
distribution of wealth varies across states and, as a consequence,
agents born in different states of nature choose a different portfolio
of currencies. Since portfolios vary across states, current account
imbalances arise among countries. For instance, suppose that coun-
try h at time t is wealthier than at time t − 1. Then, the young
born at t will hold more currency than the young born at t − 1,
since they now hold a higher share of aggregate wealth. As a result,
we show that country h runs a trade surplus at time t. To sum up,
the sign of the balance of trade depends on the past as well as on
the current state. It is important to stress that a country might
be the richest country in all states, but still run a trade deficit in
some state of nature. What is really important is how the current
wealth distribution compares with the past one.
Secondly, this model is able to give some insights on the rela-
tionship between countries’ external positions and valuation effects.
Traditionally, the net foreign asset position of a country was calcu-
lated based on the assumption that the change in net foreign assets
of a country in a given period is equivalent to the current account
6It should be possible to prove generic existence under fairly standard assumptions. We
leave this task for future research.
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position. However, recent empirical literature has pointed out that
the cumulated current account position of a country between any
two periods does not always correspond to the overall change in net
foreign assets7. Those gaps are sizable for many countries and it
has been suggested that they are induced by changes in the value
of foreign assets and liabilities, which are known in the literature
as valuation effects. Valuations effects are not accounted for in
national statistics and can be generated by capital gains or losses
on equity positions or nominal exchange rate variations. In the
case of the United States, it has been shown that they have “ben-
efited” from positive valuation effects over the last 30 years, i.e.
they have gained more on foreign assets than they lost on foreign
liabilities. As a result, net foreign liabilities are much lower than
they would be if we only took into account the current account
deficits and ignored valuation effects. It has been suggested that
the exchange rate might have played an important role in generat-
ing positive valuation effects in the US. Since US foreign assets tend
to be denominated in foreign currencies while liabilities in dollars, a
depreciation of the dollar against other currencies might have “sta-
bilized” US net foreign liabilities. Many politicians and economists
seem to think at these positive valuation effects as an “exorbitant
privilege” due to their centrality of the dollar in the international
monetary system.
Our numerical finding is that valuation effects, as driven by ex-
change rate fluctuations, are negatively related to the current ac-
count position of a country. Therefore, valuation effects have a sta-
bilizing effect on net foreign assets. This result obtains only if the
Markov process is persistent, but it is robust to changes in other pa-
rameters of the economy. The intuition can be explained as follows.
Suppose that a country receives a high value of the endowment in
some state. This country is wealthier than in the past and there-
fore runs a trade surplus (see above). Since the Markov process is
persistent, agents expect that the domestic country’s endowment is
high tomorrow with higher probability. Therefore, they substitute
the domestic good for the foreign good as they expect the domestic
good to be relatively cheaper. In order to do so, all agents demand
7See Gourinchas et al. [38] for a review of the literature on valuation effects and an
assessment of the US net external position in particular.
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more domestic currency. However, the money supply is fixed and
the price of the domestic currency today must rise in order to offset
this increase in demand. As a consequence, the value of the foreign
currencies’ holdings (foreign assets) decrease, while the value of for-
eign agents’ holdings of the domestic currency (foreign liabilities)
increases, hence the negative valuation effects. The negative rela-
tionship between the balance of trade and valuation effects is also
consistent with the empirical findings of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
[42], who showed that excess returns on net foreign assets and the
balance of trade comove negatively for a cross-section of developed
countries.
Another result is that the model is able to generate valuation
effects that are quantitatively large. In particular, valuation effects
can reduce the impact of a trade deficit or surplus on the change in
net foreign assets by more than a half for reasonable parameter val-
ues. Valuations effects are instead quantitatively small in Devereux
et al. [21]. The reason for these large effects is that we compute
the solution of the non-linear model, as opposed to Devereux et al.
[21] which uses local methods8.
The mechanism is different from what Gourinchas et al. [37]
suggest in their empirical work. In Gourinchas et al. [37], deteri-
orations in the external account must imply future excess returns
or/and trade surpluses. Their empirical results are based on the
assumption that a no-Ponzi game condition is satisfied9. While it
is true that this assumption holds in a large class of models with
infinitely lived agents, it does not necessarily in an OLG frame-
work. In this model, a deterioration in the external account means
instead that the country is experiencing current excess returns. As
far as expectations are concerned, let us consider an example with
two states of nature. Since tomorrow’s state is the same as today’s
with high probability, the exchange rate does not change with high
probability (since prices are only state dependent) and appreciates
with low probability. Therefore, agents expect an appreciation of
8Notice that Devereux et al. [21] focus on valuation effects as induced by capital gains or
losses in equity positions, not by exchange rate changes.
9Gourinchas and Rey model the world economy as a stochastic economy deviating from a
deterministic steady state. One of the stark implications of the no-Ponzi game condition is
that the lender (borrower) country is the deficit (surplus) country at the deterministic steady
state.
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the domestic currency and therefore negative valuation effects. For
the same reason, the current young will expect a trade surplus if
today’s balance of trade is in deficit.
Finally, our work offers a new perspective on the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the nominal exchange rate. In the cash-in-advance
literature (see e.g. Lucas [44], Svensson [61] and Alvarez et al. [1]),
the nominal exchange rate is a function of current endowments,
money supplies and relative prices. The structure of the economy
is such that money is not used to transfer wealth across periods
and agents are indifferent to exchange rate fluctuations. Here, we
abstract from the presence of other assets in the economy and, in
a sense, gives money a much stronger role. Firstly, it functions as
store of value, as in a standard pure exchange OLG setting. More-
over, it is necessary for transactions, since agents are required to
hold foreign currencies in order to purchase foreign goods. As a
result, the spot nominal exchange rate between any two currencies
is a forward looking variable which depends on the expected pur-
chasing power of the two currencies weighted by the old’s marginal
utilities. The demand for current and future goods, as well as the
demand for assets, are explicit functions of the spot and the future
nominal exchange rate.
Another closely related paper is Neumeyer [50], since we share
the focus on incomplete markets models with nominal assets. The
paper is an open economy extension of Magill and Quinzii’s [46]
two-period model of money, in which the indeterminacy problem
is solved by injecting money via an institution called “the Central
Exchange”. Agents cannot consume their own endowment but they
are required to sell it to the domestic Central Exchange in return
for domestic currency. The implication of this device is that the
nominal price level of each country is pinned down by a quantity
equation10. The law of one price is assumed to hold and therefore
the exchange rate directly depends on relative endowments and
money supplies. Differently from the cash-in-advance literature,
Neumeyer’s is a one-good economy and therefore relative prices do
10In Neumeyer, agents are not allowed to store the currencies by assumption. Magill and
Quinzii allow for this possibility and show that money will be stored when the interest rate
is zero. In that case, money and a risk-free bond are perfect substitutes. If the equilibrium
interest rate is instead positive, money is not held intertemporally.
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not contribute to the determination of the exchange rate. In this
respect, the exchange rate is not fully endogenous.
3.2 The model
We consider a pure exchange OLG economy with L countries. In
each period, an agent with a two-period lifetime is born in country
h and a state of nature s is realized, where s = {1, ..., S}.
The basic set up has a few similarities to Lucas [44]. Endow-
ments are assumed to follow a first-order stationary Markov process.
Agents gain utility from the consumption of L goods but they are
only endowed with a country-specific good. Therefore, there are as
many goods as countries. We will use the superscript ` to indicate
goods and currencies, while we will refer to agents with the sub-
script h. As in [44], we study the stationary equilibria of the model.
Hence, we assume that prices are only state, not time dependent.
The utility function is time-separable and preferences are not
state dependent. uh (vh) is the utility function in the first (second)
period of life. We introduce the same set of assumptions as the
stochastic OLG literature on existence (e.g. Cass et al. [13] and
Gottardi [35]):
Assumption 6 The utility functions are continuous, strictly mono-
tone and strictly quasi-concave.
Assumption 7 The utility functions are twice continuously dif-
ferentiable on RL++ and the closure of the indifference curves are
strictly contained in RL++.
At time 0, the initial old are endowed with some units of L
currencies. M ` is the stock of money issued in country `. Monetary
authorities are inactive.
The timing is organized as follows. For descriptive purposes,
suppose that endowments and preferences are such that curren-
cies have a positive value. In the first period of life, young agents
consume both the domestic and foreign goods. In order to con-
sume foreign goods, they engage in trade with the foreign young.
To finance future consumption, they sell part of their endowment
to the current old in exchange for money. We now state the key
assumptions of the model.
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Assumption 8 Currency M ` can only buy good `.
Assumption 9 To buy foreign goods when old, agents must pur-
chase foreign currencies when young.
The first restriction that we impose is that agents need the local
currency to buy the local good. Therefore, Assumption 8 introduces
what we will refer to as “cash-in-advance constraints”.
Under this Assumption, agents could buy the exact amount of
foreign currencies which allow them to consume foreign goods when
young, while hold all their savings in the domestic currency. In or-
der to consume foreign goods when old, they could buy foreign
currencies after uncertainty has been realized. In that case, there
is no actual portfolio choice to be made when young. The rationale
behind Assumption 9 is that we want uncertainty to be realized
after the currencies are chosen, with the purpose of introducing an
element of exchange rate risk in agents’ decision problem. Assump-
tion 8 alone does not restrict them to buy foreign currencies one
period in advance.
These Assumptions are a crucial aspect of the model in many
respects. First of all, they allow to pin down the equilibrium ex-
change rate and countries’ portfolios. Currencies are not perfect
substitutes in the sense that each of them has a specific role, that
is to allow agents to consume a particular good. On the contrary,
in a world of no legal restrictions in which portfolios and exchange
rates are indeterminate, only total money holdings matter and not
the currency composition. Moreover, the legal restrictions implicit
in Assumptions 8 and 9 are of fundamental importance, since a
stationary equilibrium would not exist otherwise (see below).
In principle, agents should face cash-in-advance constraints in
both periods of life. Only for simplicity, we will assume that the
young can engage in barter with other agents in their cohort and
face cash-in-advance constraints only when old. In the Appendix,
we show that the maximization problem does not change if we in-
troduced the cash-in-advance constraints when young.
Taking as given the vector of transition probabilities ρ(ss′) and
goods’ and currencies’ prices (p(s), q(s)), agent h born in state s
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solves the following maximization problem :
max
c1h(s),c2h(ss′)
uh (c1h(s)) + βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)vh (c2h(ss′)) (3.1)
subject to its budget set:
Bsh(p(s), q(s)) =
{
(c1h(s), c2h(ss
′),mh(s)) ∈ RL++ × RLS++ × RL+ :(3.2)
p(s) · [c1h(s)− ω1h(s)] 6 −q(s) ·mh(s)
p`(s′)[c`2h(ss
′)− ω`2h(s′)] 6 q`(s′)m`h(s) ∀ `, s′
m`h(s) > 0 ∀ `

Prices are all expressed in abstract units of account. Since
each agent is only endowed with the domestic good, ω1h(s) is a `-
dimensional vector where all but one element are zeros. Moreover,
ω`2h(s
′) = 0 whenever h 6= `. The second set of budget constraints
can also be thought of as cash-in advance constraints.
Let λh(s) be the multiplier associated to the young’s budget con-
straint, λ`h(ss
′) the multiplier of cash-in-advance constraint related
to good ` in state s′ and µh(s) the vector of multipliers of money
holdings’ non-negativity constraints. The necessary and sufficient
conditions for a maximum are the following first-order conditions:
c`1h(s) : u
`
h(c1h(s)) = λh(s)p
`(s) (3.3)
c`2h(ss
′) : βhρ(ss′)v`h(c2h(ss
′)) = λ`h(ss
′)p`(s′) ∀ `, s′ (3.4)
m`h(s) : −λh(s)q`(s) +
∑
s′
λ`h(ss
′)q`(s′) 6 0
= 0 if m`h(s) > 0 ∀ ` (3.5)
and the complementary slackness conditions:
λh(s){−p(s) · [c1h(s)− ω1h(s)]− q(s)mh(s)} = 0 (3.6)
λh(s) > 0
λ`h(ss
′){q`(s′)m`h(s)− p`(s′)[c`2h(ss′)− ω2h(s′)]} = 0 (3.7)
λ`h(ss
′) > 0 ∀ `, s′
where u`h(·) and v`h(·) are partial derivatives with respect to good
`. All budget constraints will hold with equality by Assumption 1
(monotonicity), therefore λh(s) > 0 and λ
`
h(ss
′) > 0.
Definition 5 A stationary equilibrium is a system of prices (p, q) ∈
RLS++×RLS+ , consumption allocations and portfolios (c1h(s), c2h(ss′),
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mh(s)) ∈ RL++ × RLS++ × RL+ for every h = 1, ..., L and s = 1, ..., S
such that:
(i) agent h maximizes (1.4) on his budget set (3.2) for every s;
(ii) z`1(s) + z
`
2(s
′s) = 0 ∀ s′, s and `;
(iii)
∑
hm
`
h(s) = M
` ∀ `, s
where z`1(s) ≡ c`1(s) − ω`1(s), z`2(s′s) ≡ c`2(s′s) − ω`2(s), c`1(s) ≡∑
h c
`
1h(s) and c
`
2(s
′s) ≡∑h c`2h(s′s).
3.2.1 The issue of existence of a stationary (monetary)
equilibrium
Spear [62] proved that a steady state equilibrium does not gener-
ically exist in a stochastic OLG economy with multiple goods.
Heuristically speaking, the non existence result is due to the fact
that there are too many equations with respect to the number of
unknowns.
However, his generic result does not rule out the possibility that
a stationary equilibrium may exist under some restrictions. For
example, he showed that additively time-separable utility functions
and one type of agent per generation are sufficient conditions.
The economy studied in this chapter is another case in which a
stationary equilibrium exists with multiple goods. In a standard
OLG economy, the old face as many budget constraints as states
of nature. If there are heterogenous agents, as we require in open
economy, separable preferences are not enough to guarantee exis-
tence. The key element of this economy is that the old face L
budget constraints in each state because of legal restrictions in cur-
rency trading. The next proposition shows that the presence of
these constraints has the important consequence that many market
clearing equations become redundant. This explains why we find
existence later in our examples.
Proposition 16 Under Assumption 6 (strict monotonicity), we
have a system of (L− 1)S + LS equations and unknowns.
Proof. Under Assumption 6, all budget constraints are binding.
Let us plug the second period budget constraints into the second
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period utility function and write the maximization problem as one
in which agent h choose L consumption goods when young and L
money balances:
max
c1h(s),mh(s)
uh (c1h(s))+βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)vh(ω`2h(s
′) +
q`(s′)
p`(s′)
m`h(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c`2h(ss
′)
) (3.8)
subject to:
p(s) · [c1h(s)− ω1h(s)] = −q(s) ·mh(s) (3.9)
Let’s recall the goods’ market clearing equations:∑
h
c`1h(s) +
∑
h
c`2h(s
′s) = ω`1(s) + ω
`
2(s) (LS
2 equations)
However, the aggregate consumption of the old does not depend
on the previous state:
∑
h c
`
2h(s
′s) = ω`2(s) +
q`(s)
p`(s)
M `. Therefore, it
is enough that the following LS goods’ market clearing equations
clear:
c`1(s) + c
`
2(ss) = ω
`
1(s) + ω
`
2(s) (LS equations)
We are basically left with LS equations plus LS money market
clearing equations. Given (3.9), Walras Law will take the following
form:
p(s) · [c1(s)− ω1(s)] = −q(s) ·M(s)
Therefore, further S market clearing equations becomes redundant.
Our economy can be reduced to a system of (L − 1)S + LS equa-
tions. We can also adopt the normalization that q1(s) = 1 for every
s11. The number of equations and the number of unknowns is iden-
tical.
Remark 1 The introduction of more currencies per se does not
solve the issue of non-existence of a stationary equilibrium.
In a one currency economy, a stationary equilibrium does not ex-
ist generically since there are (L− 1)S2 +S independent equations
and only LS unknowns (see Spear [62]). Now introduce more cur-
rencies but assume that there are no legal restrictions, i.e. that each
11We follow this normalization later in the chapter.
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currency can buy all goods. In the absence of the cash-in-advance
constraints, the introduction of more currencies has the effect of
increasing the number of independent equations to (L−1)S2 +LS,
because L currency markets must now clear in each state of na-
ture. On the other hand, the number of unknowns increases to
LS + (L− 1)S, where (L− 1)S are the exchange rates. This would
even aggravate the non existence problem as it would add relatively
more equations than unknowns.
Proposition 17 Under Assumptions 6, 8 and 9, if a stationary
equilibrium exists it is a monetary equilibrium.
Proof. We must prove that an autarkic equilibrium in which
q(s) = 0 cannot exist. By Assumption 6, the domain of vh is RL++.
Therefore, old agents consume L goods in strictly positive quan-
tities. Since they are not endowed with foreign goods, the only
option for them to consume them is to hold foreign currency. In
fact, agents are not allowed to trade the domestic endowment when
old by Assumptions 8 and 9. Hence, foreign currencies have always
a positive value so at least L − 1 conditions in (3.5) are binding
for each h. But each currency is a foreign currency to at least one
agent. Therefore, if a stationary equilibrium exists it must be an
equilibrium in which all currencies have positive value.
3.2.2 Nominal exchange rate determination
Define exchange rates as the relative price of currency ` with re-
spect to currency 1 in the state s: e`(s) ≡ q`(s)
q1(s)
. If e`(s) > e`(s′),
currency ` is worth more in state s than in state s′. If s′ was yes-
terday’s realization and s is today’s, we can say that currency ` has
appreciated with respect to currency 1.
Using equations (3.4), (3.5) and our definition, we can write
exchange rates as follows:
e`(s) =
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)v`h(c2h(ss
′)) q
`(s′)
p`(s′)∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)v1h(c2h(ss′))
q1(s′)
p1(s′)
` = 2, ..., L s = 1, ..., S
(3.10)
q`(s′)
p`(s′) gives how many units of good ` we can afford in state s
′ per
unit of currency ` held. Therefore, the relative price of currency
` is the ratio of the expected purchasing power of currency ` over
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the expected purchasing power of currency 1, weighted by agent h’s
marginal utilities. Given that the currencies are used to transfer
wealth across periods, it is expected that exchange rates follow some
sort of asset pricing equations.
The nominal exchange rate is a key price in this model as it af-
fects agents’ saving and portfolio problems. In the cash-in-advance
literature, the spot exchange rate simply depends on the current
realization of the stochastic variables and not on future ones (see
Lucas [44]). This is due to the different role that it is attributed to
money. Money is only used to carry out exchange in a given period.
Money is a “veil” and the exchange rate does not ultimately affect
the allocation, which is the same as in the barter economy. We will
provide a more detailed discussion on the role of the exchange rate
in the context of our examples.
3.2.3 Portfolio rebalancing generates trade imbalances
We now explore the relationship between the behaviour of portfolios
over time and the balance of trade.
Lemma 7 (Balance of trade) If portfolios are constant across
states, trade is always balanced.
Proof. For any pair of states s′ and s, premultiply each market
clearing equation for the respective prices p`(s) and then sum across
`:
p(s) · [z1(s) + z2(s′s)] = 0
Define the balance of trade of country h as12:
TBh(s
′s) ≡ −p(s) · [z1h(s) + z2h(s′s)] (3.11)
Using the budget constraints, it should be immediate that the bal-
ance of trade can be rewritten as:
TBh(s
′s) = q(s) · [mh(s)−mh(s′)] (3.12)
It now follows that TBh(s
′s) = 0 if mh(s′) = mh(s) for every s′.
If portfolios were to be constant across states of nature in equi-
librium, then the change in the net foreign assets position of a
12The balance of trade is defined as minus excess demand, so that it is positive when there
is excess supply in the country.
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country over time would always be equal to zero. In this case, we
have shown that the balance of trade would be in equilibrium as
we would expect from national accounting identities13. However,
the net foreign assets position of a country is not always equal to
the balance of trade. In fact, there can also be valuation effects
deriving from fluctuations of nominal exchange rates14. Our exam-
ples will show that valuation effects are absent only in very special
cases. Therefore, the Lemma stresses that we cannot have an equi-
librium in which the net foreign assets position of a country does
not change over time and yet there are trade imbalances and the
nominal exchange rate fluctuates. This is a scenario which is indeed
plausible in the Lucas model [44]. In our model, if portfolios are
constant across states then both the balance of trade and valuation
effects will be zero.
In general, it is reasonable to expect that the set of parameters
of the economy under which portfolios are state invariant has a
very small measure. If portfolios are constant across states, then
the consumption of the old does not depend on his state of birth15.
If endowments are random, agents born in different states of na-
ture do not have the same endowment and are therefore likely to
have different demands for the goods. In order for portfolios to be
constant, the demand function must be very special. The example
that we present in the next section has this property that portfolios
are constant in equilibrium. Therefore, the balance of trade is zero
as well as valuation effects by Lemma 7. If the utility function is
generalized to isoelastic utility (see sections 3.4 and 3.5), constant
portfolios can only occur for degenerate values of the endowments.
Note that the above condition does not depend on the fact that
we restrict to stationary equilibria. Instead, the following corollary
requires that prices are state dependent:
Corollary 4 If today’s realized state is the same as yesterday’s,
then trade is balanced.
The corollary is related to Polemarchakis and Salto’s result for
deterministic OLG economies [53]. In a one-currency economy,
13In fact, net income from abroad is equal to zero as there are no interest payments in the
model.
14See equation (3.18) in the next section.
15See the budget constraints of the agents when old.
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which can be thought of as a monetary union, they showed that
the balance of trade is in equilibrium at the monetary steady state.
Here, the monetary steady state is stochastic and trade imbalances
are possible when s 6= s′.
3.2.4 Net foreign assets and valuation effects: the role of
exchange rates
In this section, we explore the relationship between net foreign as-
sets, the balance of trade and valuation effects. Consider the bal-
ance of trade of country 1 in state s′s (see equation (3.12)):
TB1(s
′s) = q1(s)[m11(s)−m11(s′)]+
L∑
`=2
q`(s)[m`1(s)−m`1(s′)] (3.13)
Now, adopt the normalization that q1(s) = 1 and use the definition
of exchange rates at page 72:
tb1(s
′s) = [m11(s)−m11(s′)] +
L∑
`=2
e`(s)[m`1(s)−m`1(s′)] (3.14)
where tb1(s
′s) ≡ TB1(s′s)
q1(s)
. By currency 1’s market clearing equa-
tions, we can rewrite the first two terms on the right hand side:
tb1(s
′s) =
L∑
h=2
m1h(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL1(s′)
−
L∑
h=2
m1h(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL1(s)
+
L∑
`=2
e`(s)m`1(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FA1(s)
−
L∑
`=2
e`(s)m`1(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current value FA1(s′)
(3.15)
FA(s) are holdings of foreign assets in state s and FL(s) are foreign
holdings of the domestic currency, i.e. foreign liabilities. Now define
net foreign assets as NFA(s) ≡ FA(s) − FL(s), and rewrite the
above as follows:
NFA1(s) = current value NFA1(s
′) + tb1(s′s) (3.16)
Equation (3.16) states that the end of period net foreign assets in
country 1 is equal to the current value of the net foreign assets
accumulated in the previous period and the balance of trade16.
Now, we rewrite equation (3.15) in order to highlight valuation
effects. In the right hand side, sum and subtract FA1(s
′) and use
16This equation is equivalent to equation (1) of Gourinchas and Rey [37] (see in particular
footnote 2).
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the definition of net foreign assets to obtain:
tb1(s
′s) = NFA1(s)−NFA1(s′)+
L∑
`=2
e`(s′)m`1(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FA1(s′)
−
L∑
`=2
e`(s)m`1(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current value FA1(s′)
(3.17)
This equation can be rewritten as:
∆NFA1(s
′s) = tb1(s′s) +
L∑
`=2
r`(s′s)e`(s′)m`1(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
valuation effects
(3.18)
where
r`(s′s) = R`(s′s)− 1 ≡ e
`(s)
e`(s′)
− 1
In this model, valuation effects are entirely determined by exchange
rate movements. If foreign currencies have appreciated with respect
to the past, the “rate of return” on foreign assets is positive and
therefore we say that the country experiences positive valuation
effects. Conversely, a country experiences negative valuation effects
if foreign currencies have depreciated.
Valuation effects are thought to be very important in explaining
the dynamics of net foreign assets in the US and other countries.
This chapter provides a framework in which the exchange rate can
be state dependent and therefore valuation effects can arise. There-
fore, the change in net foreign assets will be a combination of the
balance of trade position and valuation effects. We will discuss
in more detail the interaction between exchange rates, net foreign
assets and the balance of trade in section 3.5.
3.3 A special case
In this section, we illustrate an example which can be fully solved
analytically. We specialize to a two-country setting in which con-
sumers have logarithmic preferences17. Agents born in country 1
are endowed with good 1 and agents born in country 2 are endowed
with good 2. In order to be able to derive the demand functions
in closed-form solutions, we also assume that endowments in the
second period of life are always zero:
17The example can be extended to L countries but computation becomes more cumber-
some.
79
Assumption 10 ω`2h(s) = 0 for every h, s.
From now onwards, we drop the subscript related to age in endow-
ments. We also use the normalization that q1(s) = 1 for every s.
The budget constraints are then expressed in terms of the nume´raire
currency. e(s) denotes the relative price of currency 2 with respect
to currency 1 in state s. To facilitate interpretation, we adopt the
convention that pi2(s) ≡ p2(s)
q2(s)
is the nominal price of good 2, so that
pi2(s)e(s) is the price of good 2 expressed in units of the nume´raire
currency. Similarly, pi1(s) ≡ p1(s)
q1(s)
is the nominal price of good 1.
Agent h born in state s solves the following maximization prob-
lem:
max
∑
`
log c`1h(s) + βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)
∑
`
log c`2h(ss
′)
subject to:
pi1(s)[c11h(s)− ω1h(s)] + pi2(s)e(s)[c21h(s)− ω2h(s)] =
= −m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)
pi1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(s) ∀ s′
pi2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(s) ∀ s′
where m1h (m
2
h) is the demand of agent h for currency 1 (2).
The first-order conditions are:
c11h(s) :
1
c11h(s)
= λh(s)pi
1(s) (3.19)
c21h(s) :
1
c21h(s)
= λh(s)pi
2(s)e(s) (3.20)
c`2h(ss
′) :
βhρ(ss
′)
c`2h(ss
′)
= λ`h(ss
′)pi`(s′) ∀ `, s′ (3.21)
m1h(s) : −λh(s) +
∑
s′
λ1h(ss
′) 6 0 = 0 if m1h(s) > 0(3.22)
m2h(s) : −λh(s)e(s) +
∑
s′
λ2h(ss
′) 6 0 = 0 if m2h(s) > 0(3.23)
λh(s) : pi
1(s)[c11h(s)− ω1h(s)] + pi2(s)e(s)[c21h(s)− ω2h(s)] +
+ m1h(s) + e(s)m
2
h(s) = 0 (3.24)
λ1h(ss
′) : pi1(s′)c12h(ss
′)−m1h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (3.25)
λ2h(ss
′) : pi2(s′)c22h(ss
′)−m2h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (3.26)
Since the endowment in the old age is zero for all agents, the first-
order conditions for the currencies must be binding at the solution.
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In Appendix C, we show how to derive the demand for the two
currencies of agent h:
m1h(s) =
1
2
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
m2h(s) =
1
2
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
e(s)
wh(s) denotes wealth, therefore w1(s) = pi
1(s)ω1(s) and w2(s) =
pi2(s)e(s)ω2(s). Money holdings are linear functions of wealth,
which is to be expected under log utility. Keeping nominal prices
constant, as e(s) appreciates the demand of agent 1 (2) for the
foreign currency decreases (increases).
Savings are also a constant fraction of wealth:
sh(s) ≡ m1h(s) + e(s)m2h(s) =
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
The demand functions are:
c11h(s) =
1
2
1
1 + βh
wh(s)
pi1(s)
c21h(s) =
1
2
1
1 + βh
wh(s)
pi2(s)e(s)
c12h(ss
′) =
1
2
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
pi1(s′)
∀ s′
c22h(ss
′) =
1
2
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
pi2(s′)e(s)
∀ s′
For agent 1, a high e(s) means that the “exchange value” of the
domestic endowment is lower and so is the demand for the foreign
good in the first period of life. The demand for good 2 when old
decreases as well since he acquires less foreign currency if it is rela-
tively expensive. For agent 2, a higher e(s) results instead in more
purchasing power with respect to the foreign good (good 1).
Definition 6 A stationary equilibrium is a system of prices (pi, e) ∈
R2S++×RS++, consumption allocations and portfolios (c1h(s), c2h(ss′),
mh(s)) ∈ R2++ × R2S++ × R2++ for every h = 1, ..., L and s = 1, ..., S
such that:
(i) agent h solves the above maximization problem in every s;
(ii) z11(s) + z
`
1(ss) = 0 s = 1, ..., S
(iii)
∑
hm
`
h(s) = M
` s = 1, ..., S ` = 1, 2
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In the previous section, we have shown that we have a system of
(L− 1)S market clearing equations in the goods’ markets and LS
monetary equations. Since L = 2, we have to solve for 3S prices in
a system of 3S equations.
Now, substitute the demand functions for good 1 into the market
clearing equation:
1
2
∑
h
1
1 + βh
wh(s)
pi1(s)
+
1
2
∑
h
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
pi1(s)
= ω1(s)
Substituting back wealth in its original form and rearranging, we
can pin down relative prices:
pi2(s)e(s)
pi1(s)
=
ω1(s)
ω2(s)
s = 1, ..., S (3.27)
Under this specification, the terms of trade simply depend on rela-
tive endowments. Note that purchasing power parity does not hold
unless ω1(s) = ω2(s).
Using (3.27), the money market clearing equations pin down
nominal prices:
pi1(s) =
2M1
ω1(s)
∑
h
βh
1+βh
s = 1, ..., S (3.28)
pi2(s) =
2M2
ω2(s)
∑
h
βh
1+βh
s = 1, ..., S (3.29)
Finally, the exchange rate can be computed:
e(s) = e =
M1
M2
(3.30)
Under log utility, it is remarkable that the exchange rate is constant
even though endowments follow a stochastic process and discount
factors differ across agents.
Plugging the equilibrium prices into the demand functions for
the currencies, we find that portfolios are constant across states:
m`h(s) = m
`
h =
βh
1+βh∑
h
βh
1+βh
M ` ∀ h, `
The reason for this result is very simple. Equations (3.28), (3.29)
and (3.30) show that wealth and the exchange rate are constant
in equilibrium and therefore the demand for the currencies is no
longer state dependent.
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Remark 2 Since portfolios are state-invariant, the balance of trade
is always in equilibrium (by Remark 7):
tbh(s
′s) = 0 ∀ s′, s
The fact that the spatial distribution of portfolios is constant across
states is reflected by the fact that the consumption of the old does
not depend on the state of birth (see the discussion of the previous
section). The consumption allocation is in fact:
c111(s) =
1
2
1
1+β1
ω1(s) c112(s) =
1
2
1
1+β2
ω1(s)
c211(s) =
1
2
1
1+β1
ω2(s) c212(s) =
1
2
1
1+β2
ω2(s)
c121(s
′s) = 1
2
β1
1+β1
ω1(s) c122(s
′s) = 1
2
β2
1+β2
ω1(s)
c221(s
′s) = 1
2
β1
1+β1
ω2(s) c122(s
′s) = 1
2
β2
1+β2
ω2(s)
Remark 3 If discount factors are heterogenous, the country with
the most patient agents has a positive net foreign assets position in
all states:
NFA1 ≡ e ·m21 −m12 =
M1
β1
1+β1
+ β2
1+β2
[
β1
1 + β1
− β2
1 + β2
]
Yet, trade is always balanced and the exchange rate is constant,
therefore the change in net foreign assets is obviously equal to zero.
Our findings in the log case are related to Cass and Pavlova [14],
who have shown that logarithmic utility yields very special results
even when markets are incomplete. In a two-period economy with
N Lucas trees, they found that the matrix of portfolio returns is
degenerate and that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
In the same model but with infinitely-lived agents, Pavlova and
Rigobon [51] need to introduce demand shocks in order to have a
model with time-varying portfolios. Here, a similar outcome could
be achieved by introducing state-dependent discount factors.
3.4 The leading example
In the previous section, we have presented a two-country example
in which the equilibrium allocation can be computed analytically.
However, the model loses many of its interesting features with loga-
rithmic utility, since portfolios and the exchange rate are constant.
In a sense, the predictions of the model are not “typical”.
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Yet, the analytical solution shows why things “go wrong”. Since
the system of equations is linear, in equilibrium country h’s wealth
is constant across states of nature (see equations (3.28) and (3.29))
and therefore the demand for the currencies does not vary across
states. To break this result, we now work with isoelastic utility
functions:
max
∑
`
c`1h(s)
1− 1
εh
1− 1
εh
+ βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)
∑
`
c`2h(ss
′)1−
1
εh
1− 1
εh
εh > 0, εh 6= 1
This is going to be the only difference with respect to the previous
section. Although we are not able to compute equilibrium prices
and the allocation by hand, we find closed form solutions for the de-
mand functions. This allows us to show analytically that portfolios
vary across states even when εh = ε.
The first-order conditions are:
c11h(s) : c
1
1h(s)
− 1
εh = λh(s)pi
1(s) (3.31)
c21h(s) : c
2
1h(s)
− 1
εh = λh(s)pi
2(s)e(s) (3.32)
c`2h(ss
′) : βhρ(ss′)c`2h(ss
′)
− 1
εh = λ`h(ss
′)pi`(s′) ∀ `, s′ (3.33)
m1h(s) : −λh(s) +
∑
s′
λ1h(ss
′) 6 0 (3.34)
m2h(s) : −λh(s)e(s) +
∑
s′
λ2h(ss
′) 6 0 (3.35)
λh(s) : pi
1(s)[c11h(s)− ω1h(s)] + pi2(s)e(s)[c21h(s)− ω2h(s)] +
+ m1h(s) + e(s)m
2
h(s) = 0 (3.36)
λ1h(ss
′) : pi1(s′)c12h(ss
′)−m1h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (3.37)
λ2h(ss
′) : pi2(s′)c22h(ss
′)−m2h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (3.38)
We show in the Appendix how to find closed-form solutions for the
agents’ portfolios:
m1h(s) =
βεhh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
Ah(s)
wh(s) (3.39)
m2h(s) =
βεhh e(s)
1−εh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
Ah(s)
wh(s)
e(s)
(3.40)
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where
Ah(s) ≡ pi1(s)1−εh + [pi2(s)e(s)]1−εh + βεhh
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
+
+ βεhh e(s)
1−εh
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
Agent h’s demand functions can be derived using (3.39), (3.40)
and the budget constraints (calculations of the demand functions
when young are provided in the Appendix):
c11h(s) =
pi1(s)
−εh
Ah(s)
wh(s) ∀ ` (3.41)
c21h(s) =
[pi2(s)e(s)]−εh
Ah(s)
wh(s) ∀ ` (3.42)
c12h(ss
′) =
βεhh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
Ah(s)
wh(s)
pi1(s′)
(3.43)
c22h(ss
′) =
βεhh e(s)
−εh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
Ah(s)
wh(s)
pi2(s′)
(3.44)
pi(s) and e(s) are equilibrium prices if they solve the following
system of equations (see the discussion in the log case):∑
h
c11h(s) +
∑
h
c12h(ss) = ω
1(s) ∀ s∑
h
m1h(s) = M
1 ∀ s∑
h
m2h(s) = M
2 ∀ s
In the case of identical preferences (εh = ε), this system is:
pi2(s)e(s)
pi1(s)
=
ω1(s)
ω2(s)
[pi2(s)e(s)]1−ε + βεe(s)1−ε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
pi1(s)1−ε + βε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε (3.45)
M1 =
βε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
A(s)
∑
h
wh(s) (3.46)
e(s)M2 =
βεe(s)1−ε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
A(s)
∑
h
wh(s) (3.47)
for s = {1, ..., S}, where the first equation is obtained by plugging
the demand functions into the market clearing equations for good 1
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and rearranging (as in the log case). The system is highly nonlinear
so equilibrium prices cannot be solved for analytically.
This case is of particular interest for comparison purposes, since
e.g. Lucas [44] assumes identical preferences. It can be observed
that marginal rates of substitutions are equalized. In fact, the
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution for goods 1 and 2 are
the following:
λ1h(ss
′)
λh(s)
=
pi1(s)
c11h(s)
− 1
εh
βhρ(ss
′)c12h(ss
′)−
1
εh
pi1(s′)
∀ s, s′
λ2h(ss
′)
λh(s)
=
pi2(s)e(s)
c21h(s)
− 1
εh
βhρ(ss
′)c22h(ss
′)−
1
εh
pi2(s′)
∀ s, s′
Plugging the demand functions, we get:
λ1h(ss
′)
λh(s)
=
ρ(ss′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
∀ s, s′
λ2h(ss
′)
λh(s)
=
ρ(ss′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh e(s)∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
∀ s, s′
It is now immediate we have equalization of the normalized price
vectors when εh = ε. That marginal rates of substitutions might
be equalized when preferences are identical and homothetic, despite
the incompleteness of the markets, is known in the literature18. On
the other hand, the equalization of marginal rates of substitution is
not a sufficient condition to achieve conditional Pareto optimality,
the criterion used to assess optimality of stationary OLG economies,
even when markets are sequentially complete19.
In Lucas, homotheticity is not necessary for Pareto optimality
to obtain since markets are complete. The optimal allocation is
achieved by keeping asset holdings constant across states of nature.
In this work, the OLG structure implies that the uncertainty faced
when young cannot be insured. Therefore, agents born in different
states are likely to choose a different portfolio of assets. However,
18For instance, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [32] found that the equilibrium allocation
of a two-period incomplete markets economy with nume´raire assets is constrained optimal
under such preferences. Chapter 3 of Magill and Quinzii’s book [47] is another useful refer-
ence.
19See Chattopadhyay et al. [15] for some results on optimality of stationary OLG economies
with sequentially incomplete markets.
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the marginal rates of substitution of agents born in the same state
are equalized since preferences are identical and homothetic.
3.4.1 Portfolio holdings and the distribution of wealth
The following proposition establishes that there is a strong relation-
ship between the distribution of wealth across countries, portfolio
holdings and trade imbalances.
Proposition 18 Under identical isoelastic preferences: (i) coun-
try h’s portfolio holdings depends on its current share of aggregate
wealth; (ii) if country h has a higher (lower) share of aggregate
wealth with respect to the past, it runs a trade surplus (deficit).
Proof. (i) Under identical isoelastic preferences, the demand of
agent h for the two currencies has the following form (see equations
(3.39) and (3.40)):
m`h(s) = k
`(s)ωh(s)
where k`(s) is identical across agents. Summing across h, we get
the following equation:
M ` = k`(s)
∑
h
ωh(s)
Combining the two equations, we obtain the desired result:
m`h(s)
M `
=
wh(s)
w(s)
` = 1, 2
where w(s) =
∑
hwh(s).
(ii) Suppose that today’s realized state is s and yesterday’s was
s′. By hypothesis, wh(s)
w(s)
> wh(s
′)
w(s′) . But then the above equation
implies that:
m`h(s)
M `
>
m`h(s
′)
M `
` = 1, 2
Finally, equation (3.14) implies country h has a trade surplus in
state s. The other case can be worked out in a similar way.
It is reasonable to expect that each country’s share of aggregate
wealth - expressed in the nume´raire currency - varies across states
for most parameter values. The equilibrium system of equations is
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highly non linear and constant wealth can only happen by coinci-
dence20.
The numerical examples in section 3.5 will show that this model
can generate state-dependent portfolios even under identical ho-
mothetic preferences, which is a common assumption in the in-
ternational macroeconomics’ literature. In the Lucas model, that
portfolios are constant across states is true with any additively time-
separable utility function. In a more general Lucas-tree economy,
Judd et al. [40] find the same result even with heterogenous utility
functions. When markets are complete, wealth is identical across
agents and therefore agents do not adjust their portfolio holdings
following to new shocks. As such, cash-in-advance models with
complete markets are not suitable to study the dynamics of coun-
tries’ net foreign assets. This model makes a first step in this di-
rection.
It is also interesting to compare the behaviour of the balance of
trade between this model and Lucas’. In the latter, each country
always exports half of the domestic endowment and imports half of
the foreign endowment. The sign of the balance of trade depends
on how prices respond to changes in endowments. Under isoelastic
preferences, a country is in surplus as long as the domestic endow-
ment is higher than the foreign in the current state21. The stark
implication is that a country whose endowment is always lower than
the foreign country in all states (e.g. a developing country) is al-
ways in deficit. This result is in contrast with the observation that
while many developing and emerging countries run current account
surpluses, the United States have run current account deficits for
more than a decade. In this model, both current and past vari-
ables are important to establish the sign of the balance of trade. If
a country is in surplus it is because it is relatively wealthier with
respect to the past, even though it can be poorer than the other
country in all states. This can give some intuition as to why emerg-
ing countries run a trade surplus against the United States: higher
growth in their domestic economies has meant a higher share of
world GDP and hence the trade surpluses.
20We find numerically that a degenerate case in which wealth is constant is when countries
have the same output in all states of nature.
21See the Appendix for a derivation of the balance of trade in the Lucas model under
isoelastic preferences.
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As far as the allocation of savings across assets is concerned,
Proposition 19 reveals that if preferences are identical countries do
not have very sophisticated portfolio strategies. Since wealth is
the only aspect that matters, agents hold the same share of both
currencies.
3.4.2 Exchange rate determination
Combining equations (3.46) and (3.47), we obtain the following
expression for the exchange rate:
e(s) =
(
M1
M2
) 1
ε
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−ε
ε∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−ε
ε
s = 1, ..., S (3.48)
The exchange rate is a non linear function of relative money supplies
and of expected nominal prices in the two countries, where the non
linearity comes from the elasticity of substitution being different
than one. It is also interesting to note that if the stochastic process
is i.i.d., the exchange rate is constant under isoelastic utility. This
is because not only prices are stationary, but agents will have the
same expectations in every state.
Equation (3.45) combined with (3.46) and (3.47) yields an ex-
pression for the nominal price levels in the two countries:
pi1(s) =
M1
ω1(s)
pi1(s)
1−ε
+ βε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
βε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
pi2(s) =
M2
ω2(s)
[pi2(s)e(s)]1−ε + βεe(s)1−ε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
βεe(s)1−ε
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−ε
ε
]ε
Differently from the log case, we do not have closed-form solu-
tions for the exchange rate and the price levels. As for the exchange
rate, nominal price levels are related to expected price levels.
Exchange rate movements are very important, since they con-
vey information about the sign of valuation effects and they also
have an impact on net foreign assets. Unfortunately, we cannot
make further progress on the relationship between the exchange
rate, the distribution of wealth and net foreign assets from an ana-
lytical point of view. Above, we have shown that a country that is
wealthier with respect to the past experiences a trade surplus. In
the next section, numerical examples will show that such country
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does also experience an appreciation of the exchange rate and hold
a positive net foreign asset position.
3.5 Countries’ external positions and valuation
effects
The aim of this section is to gain some insights on the behaviour
of open economy variables such as the exchange rate, the balance
of trade and net foreign asset positions. For this purpose, we study
in detail two examples. In the first example, both countries are
developed in the sense that the mean endowment across states is
the same. In the second, one country is developed and the other is
developing since the former country has a higher endowment in all
states of nature. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two
states.
The first result is that current account deficits (surpluses) are
associated with positive (negative) valuation effects as long as the
Markov process is persistent. This is consistent with Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti’s [42] empirical finding that “adjusted returns” are
negatively correlated with the trade balance in a cross-section of de-
veloped countries22. In section 3.3, we have shown that a country
experiences positive valuation effects on foreign assets when the do-
mestic currency depreciates. In general, exchange rates movements
are not the only source of valuation effects, but the literature has
stressed that they are key to the understanding of the dynamics
of countries’ net external positions (e.g. [38]). We will explain the
relationship between the current account and the exchange rate in
the context of the examples. For the moment, we wish to emphasize
that these two variables behave in a very different way. The sign
of the balance of trade depends on how the current distribution of
wealth compares to the past one. On the other hand, the exchange
rate is driven by agents’ expectations of nominal price levels in the
two countries.
Moreover, we find that valuation effects can reduce the extent
of changes in net foreign assets due to trade imbalances by more
22Lane and Milesi-Ferretti do not distinguish across different sources of valuation effects.
“Adjusted returns” include valuation effects stemming from exchange rate movements, but
it is more broadly defined. For instance, it also incorporates capital gains and losses.
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than 50% for reasonable parameter values, and therefore they sig-
nificantly contribute to the dynamics of net foreign assets. This is
important since valuation effects are a crucial component of coun-
tries’ net external positions. For instance, a stylized fact for the
US is that there is a sizable gap between the United States’ net
external position and their cumulated current account deficits due
to positive valuation effects on net foreign assets (see the discussion
in Gourinchas and Rey [38]). Other papers, such as Devereux and
Sutherland [21], have focused on valuation effects stemming from
movements in equity prices and dividend payments. However, they
find valuation effects that are quantitatively small.
3.5.1 Example 1: developed countries
In this example, the two countries are developed since the mean
endowment is the same across countries. We assume that country
1’s output is more volatile than country 223:
Symmetric shocks Asymmetric shocks
ω1(1) = 8 ω1(2) = 12 ω1(1) = 8 ω1(2) = 12
ω2(1) = 9 ω2(2) = 11 ω2(1) = 11 ω2(2) = 9
We say that shocks are symmetric when a state is good (or bad) for
both countries. In this example, state 1 is the bad state and state
2 is the good state. In the asymmetric case, state 1 (2) is the good
state for country 2 (1). The other parameter values are chosen as
follows24:
M1 = M2 = M = 10
ε1 = ε2 = ε = 2
β1 = β2 = β = 0.9
ρ(ss) = 0.8
When the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods is greater
than 1, consumption goods are gross substitutes. Such parametriza-
tion rules out episodes of “immiserizing growth”. In fact, when
0 < ε < 1, a country that experiences a positive shock (everything
23If countries had identical, but state-dependent endowments, nominal price levels would
be identical across countries and the exchange rate would be constant.
24The money supplies are chosen to be identical since their level does not affect the allo-
cation.
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else equal) is poorer in value terms since the price of the domes-
tic good falls too much. In other words, the terms of trade effect
dominates changes in endowments25. Empirical work based on low-
frequency data found elasticities between 4 and 15, while estimates
at higher frequency suggest that the elasticity is much lower and
in the range of 0.2 to 3.5 (see Ruhl [55]). Our parametrization is
more in line with the international real business cycle literature.
We have also assumed that the Markov process is persistent26.
We report in brackets the equilibrium prices related to the asym-
metric shocks case:
pi1(1) = 2.6875 [2.6875] pi1(2) = 1.9281 [1.9281]
pi2(1) = 2.4370 [2.0676] pi2(2) = 2.0677 [2.4369]
e(1) = 1.0309 [1.0830] e(2) = 0.9804 [0.9333]
The first observation is that the nominal price level of each country
decreases with the domestic endowment. Relative prices, expressed
in the nume´raire currency, are defined as:
pi(s) ≡ pi
2(s)e(s)
pi1(s)
Therefore:
pi(1) = 0.9348 [0.8332]
pi(2) = 1.0514 [1.1796]
From country 1’s perspective, when pi(s) increases the terms of
trade worsens since the price of imports rises relatively to the price
of exports. In the asymmetric case, good 1 is relatively cheaper in
state 2 since the country experiences a positive shock. When shocks
are symmetric, this is still the case because the shock in country 1
is bigger than in country 2.
It can also be observed that the country that experiences a posi-
tive shock (or a larger positive shock) has its currency appreciated.
For instance, let us explain the mechanics of why currency 1 appre-
ciates in state 2 (e(s) falls). From the exchange rate equation (3.48),
it can be checked that the exchange rate decreases (increases) with
25A similar issue arises in the simplest possible setting, i.e. a static GE model with isoelastic
utility and corner endowments. See also Cole and Obstfeld [17] and Lucas [44].
26We provide results for different values of the elasticity and the persistence parameter in
the Appendix.
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future price levels in country 2 (1):
∂e(s)
∂pi2(s′)
< 0
∂e(s)
∂pi1(s′)
> 0 for ε > 1
The intuition is the following. Country 1 (2) has a low (high)
price level in state 2. Since the Markov process is persistent, agents
will expect a lower (higher) price level in country 1 (2) than if they
were born in the other state. As goods are gross substitutes, the
young substitute good 1 for good 2 and therefore demand relatively
more currency 1 (see equation (C.14) in the Appendix). However,
the money supply is fixed, therefore the relative price of currency
1 has to increase. When shocks are symmetric, both countries ex-
perience a positive shock in state 2. However, the shock in country
1 is bigger and therefore currency 1 appreciates.
On the left (right) column, we report the money holdings of
agents born in country 1 (2):
m11(1) = 4.8741 [4.6606] m
1
2(1) = 5.1259 [5.3394]
m21(1) = 4.8741 [4.6606] m
2
2(1) = 5.1259 [5.3394]
m11(2) = 5.0922 [5.3059] m
1
2(2) = 4.9078 [4.6941]
m21(2) = 5.0922 [5.3059] m
2
2(2) = 4.9078 [4.6941]
To interpret these results, let us define country 1’s share of aggre-
gate wealth in state s as θ1(s), measured in the nume´raire currency:
θ1(s) ≡ pi
1(s)ω1(s)
pi1(s)ω1(s) + pi2(s)e(s)ω2(s)
Since preferences are identical, the share of the country’s aggregate
wealth dictates the share of currencies held by its young agents.
Country 1 is always more endowed than country 2 in state 2 and
viceversa. Therefore, country 1 is wealthier in state 2 but poorer in
state 1. In fact, the share held by agents born in country 1 in the
two states are: θ1(1) = 0.4874 [0.4661] and θ1(2) = 0.5092 [0.5306].
In the previous section, we have shown that we can infer the
sign of the balance of trade from countries’ portfolio holdings. The
balance of trade of country h in state (s′s) is:
tbh(s
′s) ≡ [m1h(s)−m1h(s′)] + e(s)[m2h(s)−m2h(s′)]
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Therefore:
tb1(21) = −0.4429 [−1.3442]
tb1(12) = 0.4319 [1.2476]
Obviously, tb2(s
′s) = −tb1(s′s). As expected, the country that
experiences a positive shock is in surplus since it is the wealthiest
country, while the poorer country is in deficit. Note that a current
account surplus is associated with an appreciation of the domestic
currency and viceversa. When shocks are asymmetric, portfolios
change more across states and therefore trade imbalances are even
larger.
A more traditional definition of the balance of trade is the dif-
ference between exports and imports:
tb1(s
′s) ≡ pi1(s)[c112(s) + c122(s′s)]− pi2(s)e(s)[c211(s) + c221(s′s)]
The left (right) column reports the consumption allocation for agents
born in country 1 (2):
c111(1) = 2.0856 [1.9943] c
1
12(1) = 2.1934 [2.2848]
c211(1) = 2.3866 [2.8726] c
2
12(1) = 2.5100 [3.2911]
c121(11) = 1.8137 [1.7341] c
1
22(11) = 1.9073 [1.9868]
c221(11) = 2.0000 [2.2540] c
2
22(11) = 2.1034 [2.5823]
c121(12) = 2.5278 [2.4172] c
1
22(12) = 2.6585 [2.7693]
c221(12) = 2.3573 [1.9123] c
2
22(12) = 2.4790 [2.1910]
c111(2) = 3.4697 [3.6152] c
1
12(2) = 3.3439 [3.1984]
c211(2) = 3.1387 [2.5981] c
2
12(2) = 3.0250 [2.2986]
c121(21) = 1.8948 [1.9743] c
1
22(21) = 1.8262 [1.7466]
c221(21) = 2.0895 [2.5661] c
2
22(21) = 2.0139 [2.2702]
c121(22) = 2.6409 [2.7519] c
1
22(22) = 2.5454 [2.4346]
c221(22) = 2.4627 [2.1772] c
2
22(22) = 2.3736 [1.9262]
Consider the balance of trade of country 1 in state 12. First, let
us look at the asymmetric case. The terms of trade worsens for
country 1 since the foreign good is relatively more expensive. As a
matter of fact, country 1’s consumption of the foreign good (c211(2)
and c221(12)) is lower than in state 21. Despite that the price of
the foreign good is higher, the value of imports falls. On the other
hand, the value of exports increase since good 1 is now cheaper.
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In fact, country 2’s consumption of the domestic good (c112(2) and
c122(12)) are higher than in state 21. The net effect is unambiguous:
country 1 experiences a trade surplus in state 12.
When shocks are symmetric, both imports and exports increase
since both goods are cheaper than in state 1. However, the relative
price of good 2 is still higher since country 2 experiences a smaller
positive shock. Therefore, exports increase more than imports and
the net effect is that the balance of trade is in surplus.
In this context, net foreign assets can be defined as holdings of
foreign currency (foreign assets) minus foreign holdings of domestic
currency (foreign liabilities):
NFA1(s) ≡ m21(s)e(s)−m12(s)
NFA2(s) ≡ −NFA1(s)
Net foreign assets of country i are:
NFA1(1) = −0.1012 [−0.2920]
NFA1(2) = 0.0846 [0.2579]
Country 1 has a positive net foreign asset position in state 2 for
two reasons. Since the country is wealthier, it holds more money.
Therefore, the country holds more foreign assets and also less lia-
bilities. The foreign currency depreciates, but quantity effects are
more important than exchange rate movements. In the asymmetric
shock case, the net position is larger since the country holds even
more assets and less liabilities.
It is worth noting that while the balance of trade’s position de-
pends on the previous state as well as on the current state, the net
foreign assets’ position only depends on the current state. In this
example, country 1’s positive (negative) net foreign asset position
is associated with a trade surplus (deficit) in state 12 (21). In states
11 and 22, countries have non-zero net foreign assets but balanced
trade.
We now examine the issue of valuation effects and how they
affect countries’ net external position. In this two-country two-
states example, the change in net foreign assets can be written as
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follows:
∆NFA1(s
′s) ≡ tb1(s′s) + r2(s′s)e(s′)m21(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
valuation effects
where r2(s′s) ≡ e(s)
e(s′)−1. We will refer to r2(s′s) as to excess returns.
Therefore:
r2(21) = 0.0515 [0.1604]
r2(12) = −0.0490 [−0.1382]
and
V AL1(21) = 0.2571 [0.7943]
V AL1(12) = −0.2462 [−0.6976]
The overall change in net foreign assets in the two states is:
∆NFA1(21) = −0.1858 [−0.5499]
∆NFA1(12) = 0.1857 [0.5499]
In both states, it can be observed that the change in net foreign
assets in country 1 is much lower than the actual trade imbalance.
Valuation effects have the opposite sign of the balance of trade
and they reduce surpluses or deficits by more than 50%. Since
the exchange rate is more volatile in the asymmetric case, excess
returns are larger and so are valuation effects.
To sum up, this is what happens to a country experiencing a
positive shock:
ωh(s) ↑ ⇒ TOT worsens⇒ tbh(s′s) > 0
⇒ higher money holdings⇒ NFAh(s) > 0
⇒ domestic currency appreciates⇒ V ALh(s) < 0
and
tbh(s
′s) > 0 & V ALh(s) < 0 ⇒ ∆NFAh(s′s) > 0
The country that experiences a positive shock has a higher wealth
as long as the elasticity is greater than one. The young agents
will hold more currency and therefore the country’s net external
position is positive. Since the domestic good is relatively cheaper,
exports increase while imports fall. Therefore, the country runs a
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trade surplus. The domestic currency is more expensive (appreci-
ates) to offset a high demand for the domestic good due to a low
expected price level in the country. As a result, foreign assets accu-
mulated in the previous period depreciates. The negative valuation
effects counterbalance the trade surplus and therefore reduce the
size of the positive change in net foreign assets.
Robustness checks In the Appendix, we vary elasticity of sub-
stitution and the persistence parameter and find the following:
Result 1 Current account surpluses (deficits) are associated with
negative (positive) valuation effects for 0 < ε <∞, but only as long
as ρ(ss) > 0.5.
Assuming that ε < 1 does not invalidate the negative relation-
ship between the balance of trade and valuation effects. The only
difference is that the effects of endowments shocks are the opposite.
For instance, a country with the positive shock is instead poorer
in equilibrium. Therefore, that country holds less currency and
has a negative net foreign asset position. The terms of trade falls
too much and offset the increase in export, hence the country runs
a current account deficit. The domestic currency now depreciates
following a positive shock. Despite that agents expect a low price
of good 1 tomorrow, the wealth effect dominates the substitution
effects, so domestic agents will demand less currency 1. Foreign
agents need less currency 1 to carry out their consumption plan,
if they expect the price of good 1 to be low. However, the money
supply is fixed and therefore currency 1 depreciates in order for
both agents to demand the same share of both currencies.
Even in this case, the actual change in net foreign assets is lower
than the trade imbalance. On the other hand, it is important to
assume that the Markov process is persistent for such result to hold.
Now, suppose that ε > 1 but that the Markov process is not per-
sistent (ρ(ss) < 0.5). Valuation effects now reinforce the country’s
current account balance. For example, if a country is in surplus
it experiences positive valuation effects. The reason is that agents
will not expect a low price level in the surplus country following a
positive shock. Since the probability that tomorrow is a bad state
is higher, agents will expect inflation and demand less currency
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instead. Therefore, the domestic currency depreciates and foreign
assets are revaluated.
3.5.2 Example 2: developing vs. developed country
Now, country 1 is our developed country since it has a higher en-
dowment than country 2 in both states. Throughout this example,
we wish to highlight the fact that both the current and the past
state of nature are important to establish the direction of trade
among countries. In the Lucas model with isoelastic preferences, a
country whose endowment is higher than the other in all states of
nature (developed country) is always in surplus (see the Appendix).
This result is at odds with the fact that the United States run cur-
rent account deficits against emerging economies. Here, we show
that the developed country runs a deficit if the other country ex-
periences a positive shock (or a larger positive shock if shocks are
symmetric).
In the symmetric scenario, state 1 is the bad state and state 2 is
the good state for both countries. In the asymmetric one, the good
state for a country is the bad state for the other. Output is also
more volatile in the developing country.
Symmetric shocks Asymmetric shocks
ω1(1) = 10 ω1(2) = 11 ω1(1) = 11 ω1(2) = 10
ω2(1) = 7 ω2(2) = 9 ω2(1) = 7 ω2(2) = 9
Other parameters are chosen as in Example 1. We report in square
brackets the equilibrium prices and allocation for the asymmetric
shock case:
pi1(1) = 2.2151 [2.0488] pi1(2) = 2.0488 [2.2151]
pi2(1) = 3.1182 [3.1184] pi2(2) = 2.5380 [2.5381]
e(1) = 0.8543 [0.8345] e(2) = 0.8877 [0.9087]
Since endowments in country 2 are lower than in country 1 in all
states, the nominal price level in country 2 is always higher. Money
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holdings are:
m11(1) = 5.4294 [5.5301] m
1
2(1) = 4.5706 [4.4699]
m21(1) = 5.4294 [5.5301] m
2
2(1) = 4.5706 [4.4699]
m11(2) = 5.2639 [5.1624] m
1
2(2) = 4.7361 [4.8376]
m21(2) = 5.2639 [5.1624] m
2
2(2) = 4.7361 [4.8376]
Since country 1 has always a higher endowment in both states, it
is always richer than country 2 and its agents hold a higher share
of both currencies in every state. However, country 2’s share of
aggregate wealth (θ2(s)) is higher in state 2 and therefore its agents
holds relatively more money in this state27. In fact, the share held
by agents born in the developed country in the two states are:
θ1(1) = 0.5429 [0.5530] and θ1(2) = 0.5264 [0.5162].
The balance of trade of country 1 when s 6= s′ is:
tb1(21) = 0.3069 [0.6745]
tb1(12) = −0.3124 [−0.7018]
Despite that country 1 is richer in both states, it runs a trade
deficit when the developing country experiences a positive shock.
Even though both countries experience a positive shock in state
2, the shock is bigger in country 2 and therefore its young agents
hold more currency than if they were born in state 1. This simple
fact generates a trade surplus for the developing country. As in
the previous example, a trade deficit (surplus) is associated to the
depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency.
Let us now consider the balance of trade in terms of exports and
27When the shocks are asymmetric, country 1 obviously holds more in the good state and
less in the bad state.
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imports. The consumption allocation is:
c111(1) = 2.9784 [3.3840] c
1
12(1) = 2.5073 [2.7351]
c211(1) = 2.0594 [2.0976] c
2
12(1) = 1.7336 [1.6954]
c121(11) = 2.4511 [2.6992] c
1
22(11) = 2.0634 [2.1817]
c221(11) = 1.7413 [1.7735] c
2
22(11) = 1.4658 [1.4335]
c121(12) = 2.6500 [2.4965] c
1
22(12) = 2.2309 [2.0179]
c221(12) = 2.1392 [2.1789] c
2
22(12) = 1.8008 [1.7612]
c111(2) = 3.2210 [2.8319] c
1
12(2) = 2.8981 [2.6537]
c211(2) = 2.6636 [2.6122] c
2
12(2) = 2.3965 [2.4477]
c121(21) = 2.3763 [2.5197] c
1
22(21) = 2.1381 [2.3612]
c221(21) = 1.6882 [1.6556] c
2
22(21) = 1.5189 [1.5514]
c121(22) = 2.5692 [2.3305] c
1
22(22) = 2.3117 [2.1839]
c221(22) = 2.0740 [2.0340] c
2
22(22) = 1.8660 [1.9061]
Agents born in country 1 always consume more than agents in coun-
try 2 because they are relatively richer. The terms of trade for
country 1 are:
pi(1) = 1.2026 [1.2706]
pi(2) = 1.0997 [1.0412]
To start with, it is easier to look at the case of asymmetric shocks.
Country 1 is in deficit in state 12 for two reasons. In state 2,
the foreign country experiences a positive shock. First, domestic
consumption of the foreign good is higher than in state 1 since good
2 is cheaper. Since goods are gross substitutes, changes in quantities
are greater than changes in prices. Therefore, the value of imports
increase. Second, foreign consumption of good 1 is lower precisely
because good 1 is relatively more expensive. As a consequence, the
value of exports drops. Higher imports and lower exports means
that country 1 is in deficit. A similar argument can be made to
explain why country 1 is in surplus in state 21.
In the symmetric shocks case, good 2 is still cheaper and there-
fore imports increase. The difference is now that exports increase
as well, since the domestic price level falls due to a positive shock.
However, the demand of good 2 increases more in relative terms
since the terms of trade improves. Overall, imports rise more than
exports and country 1 runs a deficit.
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Net foreign assets are:
NFA1(1) = 0.0677 [0.1450]
NFA1(2) = −0.0633 [−0.1465]
while excess returns are:
r2(12) = 0.0391 [0.0889]
r2(21) = −0.0376 [−0.0817]
Therefore:
∆NFA1(12) = −0.1310 [−0.2915]
V AL1(12) = 0.1814 [0.4103]
∆NFA1(21) = 0.1310 [0.2915]
V AL1(21) = −0.1758 [−0.3830]
As in the previous example, a current account deficit (surplus) is
associated with positive (negative) valuation effect due to the de-
preciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency.
Robustness checks We do not comment the results of the sensi-
tivity analysis since they are the same as for the previous example
(see the Appendix).
3.6 Conclusions and future research
This chapter provides a stylized model of exchange rate determina-
tion where changes in the net foreign assets’ position of a country
are a consequence of trade imbalances among countries and val-
uation effects due to exchange rate movements. Under identical
isoelastic preferences, agents born in a given state of nature hold
a fraction of the total money stocks equivalent to their share of
aggregate wealth. Since the distribution of wealth among countries
varies across states, trade imbalances arise at the country level. We
have also shown that the exchange rate fluctuates because of the
Markov structure of uncertainty. The spot exchange rate between
any two currencies is a function of expected purchasing power of
the currencies with respect to the domestic good. Since agents’ ex-
pectations depend on the state of birth, the exchange rate is state
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dependent. In this framework, exchange rate movements are big
enough to generate relevant valuation effects.
An aspect of the model that needs further investigation is coun-
tries’ portfolio choices when preferences are heterogenous. Under
identical isoelastic preferences, agents choose all currencies in the
same proportion. If the elasticity of substitution is allowed to vary
across agents, wealth is no longer the only variable that pins down
portfolios. Depending on the endowment structure, agents might
prefer to hold more domestic currency in some state while more for-
eign currency in some other state, or even have a clear cut “prefer-
ence” for a particular currency. For instance, it would be interesting
to investigate under which conditions agents tend to have a bias to-
wards domestic assets, as observed in the empirical literature28. An
important direction of research would also be to provide a proof of
generic existence and determinacy of equilibrium, in order to assess
the robustness of the model.
Finally, a major challenge is to generalize the model by intro-
ducing further assets, in addition to the currencies in positive net
supply. One option would be to look at the case of assets in zero
net supply (e.g. bonds), to be denominated in different currencies.
Past research on the topic has shown that this is no simple task.
When there are no currencies in positive net supply, Polemarchakis
[52] showed that the degree of indeterminacy in a two-period model
with incomplete markets is NS − A(N − 1) − N , where N is the
number of currencies and A is the number of assets. Another exten-
sion would be to introduce other assets in positive net supply such
as Lucas trees, in order to make our framework directly compara-
ble with Lucas [44]. The incompleteness due to the OLG structure
could be the key to break Lucas’ [44] constant portfolios result.
Both these extensions do not appear to be straightforward, given
the particular structure of our model. However, this is the path
to follow if we wish to achieve a better understanding of countries’
portfolio choices and exchange rate behaviour.
28See Coeurdacier et al. [18] for a recent review of the literature on “home bias”.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Take equation (1.15) for any t > 1 and define the function g
as follows:
g(kt+1; kt, τ1, ρ1, ρ2) ≡ (1 + n)kt+1 −
− [ρ1s1(f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt, f ′(kt+1), τ1) +
+ ρ2s2(f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt, f ′(kt+1))]
We want to establish the existence of kt+1 > 0 given kt > 0,
such that g(kt+1; kt, τ1, ρ1, ρ2) = 0. To do that, we study the
sign of g as kt+1 tends to infinity and zero. The first limit tells
us that g is positive for kt+1 approaching infinity:
lim
kt+1→+∞
g(kt+1; kt, τ1, ρ1, ρ2) = +∞ (A.1)
(savings are always bounded above by wt). Therefore, for at
least a kt+1 > 0 to exist we need:
lim
kt+1→0
g(kt+1; kt, τ1, ρ1, ρ2) < 0 (A.2)
When ρ1 = 1 (closed economy), De La Croix et al. [25] show
that it is enough that the young’s income after tax is strictly
positive for savings to be positive, as savings are increasing
in income. In particular, the following condition must hold :
wt > τ1. It turns out that the same condition is valid in a two-
country economy. It is not sufficient that aggregate savings are
positive, since we only allow for strictly positive consumption.
Therefore, for an equilibrium to exist we need both countries’
savings to be positive.
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Now, define τ¯1(kt) as the level of tax for which savings are
zero in country 1 (it is obvious that τ¯1 is increasing in kt).
Therefore, as long as τ1 < τ¯1(kt), equation (A.2) is satisfied
and therefore kt+1 exists.
We now prove that kt+1 is unique given kt. By Assumption 1,
g is increasing in kt+1:
g′(kt+1) = 1 + n− srf ′′(kt+1) > 0 ∀ kt+1
This is enough to ensure uniqueness. We can then write
kt+1 = φ(kt; τ1, ρ1, ρ2)
which is a single-valued, strictly increasing function in kt
1.
The above discussion is also valid at t = 0. It follows that
if τ1 < τ¯1(k1,0) at time 0, k1 > 0 exists given (k1,0, k2,0) and
is unique. A unique intertemporal equilibrium will exist by
induction.
(ii) We know already that the saving locus of the economy is in-
creasing. Suppose that
lim
kt→0
φ(kt; τ1, ρ1, ρ2)
kt
> 1
For the saving locus to cross the 45 degree line from above at
least once, we need to show that the following is true:
lim
kt→+∞
φ(kt; τ1, ρ1, ρ2)
kt
< 1 (A.3)
The argument is the same as for closed economies and relies on
the fact that savings can never exceed the wage (see Azariadis
[3], p. 84). Since
(1 + n)kt+1 = ρ1s1,t + ρ2s2,t 6 wt
that condition (A.3) is satisfied can be shown by dividing both
sides of the inequality by kt and then taking the limit:
lim
kt→+∞
[
φ(kt; τ1, ρ1, ρ2)
kt
]
6 1
1 + n
lim
kt→+∞
[
f(kt)
kt
− f ′(kt)
]
= 0
This proves the existence of at least one locally stable steady
state.
1See Galor et al. [30] for a throughout study of the function φ.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the budget constraints of the agents born at t at equi-
librium:
ct∗1,t +
ct∗1,t+1
1 + r∗t+1
= w∗t − τ1
r∗t+1 − n
1 + r∗t+1
≡ I∗1,t
ct∗2,t +
ct∗2,t+1
1 + r∗t+1
= w∗t ≡ I∗2,t
It is easy to see that the two agents will always have different budget
sets, except in the case r∗ = n where I∗1,t = I
∗
2,t. Iff n > r
∗
t+1,
I∗1,t > I
∗
2,t . Because of that, note that the budget line of agent 1 is
to the right of agent 2’s budget line. It is parallel as they face the
same interest rate r∗t+1. Marginal rates of substitutions of the two
agents are obviously equalized:
1 + r∗t+1 =
u′(ct∗1,t)
βv′(ct∗1,t+1)
=
u′(ct∗2,t)
βv′(ct∗2,t+1)
Because utility functions are identical across agents and consump-
tion goods are normal, we can conclude that ct∗1,t > c
t∗
2,t and c
t∗
1,t+1 >
ct∗2,t+1. If r
∗
t+1 > n, the opposite is true.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let kaut2 be the level of capital such that country 2 is at the
autarkic steady state, and define the function g2 as follows:
g2(k
aut
2 ) ≡ (1 + n)kaut2 − s2(f(kaut2 )− f ′(kaut2 )kaut2 , f ′(kaut2 )) = 0
where
g′2(k
aut
2 ) = 1 + n+ swf
′′(kaut2 )k
aut
2 − srf ′′(kaut2 )
When the steady state is stable, g′2(k
aut
2 ) > 0 as
dk2,t+1
dk2,t
(kaut2 ) =
−f ′′(kaut2 )kaut2 sw
1 + n− srf ′′(kaut2 )
< 1
Similarly, let k∗ be the steady state world capital stock and
define the function g for the world economy:
g(k∗; τ1, ρ1, ρ2) ≡ (1 + n)k∗ − [ρ1s1(f(k∗)− f ′(k∗)k∗, f ′(k∗), τ1) +
+ ρ2s2(f(k
∗)− f ′(k∗)k∗, f ′(k∗))] = 0 (A.4)
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Now suppose that k∗ = kaut2 . From equation (1.11), we know that
country 1 saves less than country 2 for any k, then g(kaut2 ; τ1, ρ1, ρ2) >
0. Note that g′(kaut2 ; τ1, ρ1, ρ2) = g
′
2(k
aut
2 ), and therefore for g to be
zero k must fall. It follows that k∗ < kaut2 .
Similarly, it can be shown that kautss1 < k
∗. Diminishing returns
to capital implies that rautss1 > r
∗ > raut2 .
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) At t = 0, the world capital market clears if the following equa-
tion holds:
(1 + n)k∗1 = ρ1s1(f(k1,0)− f ′(k1,0)k1,0, f ′(k∗1), τ1) +
+ ρ2s2(f(k2,0)− f ′(k2,0)k2,0, f ′(k∗1))
Under Hypothesis 2, s∗1,0 > s
∗
2,0. By Proposition 1, it follows
that:
z1,0 < 0 z2,0 > 0
Because of no trade in the previous period, the countries’ trade
balances will only reflect the current trade in the capital mar-
ket: tbi,0 = −zi,0. Hence:
tb1,0 > 0 tb2,0 < 0
(ii) Let us write the balance of trade of country 1 at t = 1:
tb∗1,1 = −z∗1,1 + z∗1,0
1 + r∗1
1 + n
Because z∗1,1 > 0 (Proposition 1) and we have shown that
z∗1,0 < 0, then tb
∗
1,1 < 0.
A.2 A Cobb-Douglas Example
In this section, we derive the model for Cobb-Douglas utility and
production functions:
U(cti,t, c
t
i,t+1) = β log c
t
i,t + (1− β) log cti,t+1 (A.5)
f(kt) = k
α
t (A.6)
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We can study this example in some detail as our variables of
interest have a simpler dynamics with Cobb-Douglas functions.
From profit maximization, the factor prices are:
rt = αk
α−1
t − δ (A.7)
wt = (1− α)kαt (A.8)
The saving functions in the two countries are:
s1,t = (1− β)(wt − τ1)− βτ1 1 + n
1 + rt+1
(A.9)
s2,t = (1− β)wt (A.10)
It is known that, with log-utility, savings are a constant fraction of
the wage and do not depend on the rate of interest. In country 1,
the young also consume a fraction of the discounted future transfer.
Overall, the impact of the pay-as-you-go system on country 1’s
savings is:
∂s1,t
∂τ1
= −(1− β)− β 1 + n
1 + rt+1
= −1 + β rt+1 − n
1 + rt+1
(A.11)
The market clearing equation for capital is:
K∗t+1 = L1,t
[
(1− β)((1− α)k∗αt − τ1)− βτ1
1 + n
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
]
+
+ L2,t(1− β)(1− α)k∗αt (A.12)
The capital stock evolves over time as follows:
(1 + n)k∗t+1 = (1− β)(1− α)k∗αt −
− ρ1τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
]
(A.13)
while the steady state capital stock satisfies:
(1 + n)k∗ = (1− β)(1− α)k∗α − ρ1τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + αk∗α−1 − δ
]
(A.14)
For any given kt > 0, it can be verified that kt+1 > 0 exists as long
as (1− α)kαt − τ1 > 0 (see Lemma 1) and that the higher is τ1, the
lower kt+1 will be given kt. It can also be checked that the saving
locus is increasing (here, sr = 0):
dkt+1
dkt
=
(1− β)α(1− α)kα−1t
(1 + n)− ρ1τ1β(1+n)α(α−1)k
α−2
t+1
(1+αkα−1t+1 −δ)2
> 0 (A.15)
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The specific feature of this example is that the saving locus is con-
cave as d
2kt+1
(dkt)2
< 0. However, note that the saving locus of the
economy does not start at the origin as in the case τ1 = 0. In fact,
(kt, kt+1) = (0, 0) does not satisfy equation (A.13). When kt = 0,
kt+1 must be negative.
With τ1 = 0, it is known that there exists a globally unique
steady state with Cobb Douglas utility and production function.
With τ1 > 0, the number of steady states depends on how big
is the tax. If the tax is small enough, then there are two steady
states (one unstable and one stable). At a certain threshold for
the tax, the steady state is not hyperbolic and above that we have
non-existence of steady states. See [25] for a detailed discussion2.
A.2.1 Trade and Consumption
We can now compute the excess demand. For instance, for country
1:
z∗1,t = ρ2τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
]
(A.16)
It can be verified that ∂z1,t
∂kt+1
> 0.
At the golden rule kGR and other stationary allocations, z1 is
respectively:
zGR1 = ρ2τ1 (A.17)
z∗1 = ρ2τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + αk∗α−1 − δ
]
(A.18)
Using the capital flows definition (24), we can plug equation
(A.16) in and compute the balance of trade of country 1:
tb∗1,t = ρ2τ1(1− β)
[
(αk∗α−1t − δ)− n
1 + n
]
+
+ ρ2τ1β
[
(αk∗α−1t+1 − δ)− n
1 + αk∗α−1t+1 − δ
]
(A.19)
(A.20)
When both interest rates are bigger than the population growth
rate, it is evident that tb∗1,t > 0. Suppose now at a given t¯, k
∗¯
t
and k∗¯t+1 are such that r
∗¯
t > n and r
∗¯
t+1 < n. The first part of the
equation is positive and reflects the fact that the old in country
2 are consuming more (exports). But part two is negative as the
2They discuss a closed economy, but the substance of the argument does not change.
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young in country 2 are now consuming less (imports). It is now
clear that which of the two is bigger will also depend on β.
In the long-run, the balance of trade satisfies:
tb∗1 =
(αk∗α−1 − δ)− n
1 + n
ρ2τ1
[
(1− β) + β(1 + n)
1 + αk∗α−1 − δ
]
(A.21)
The two representative agents’ consumption obeys:
ct∗1,t = β
[
(1− α)kα∗t − τ1
(αkα−1∗t+1 − δ)− n
1 + αkα−1∗t+1 − δ
]
ct∗1,t+1 = (1 + αk
α−1∗
t+1 − δ)(1− β)
[
(1− α)kα∗t − τ1
(αkα−1∗t+1 − δ)− n
1 + αkα−1∗t+1 − δ
]
ct∗2,t = β(1− α)kα∗t
ct∗2,t+1 = (1 + αk
α−1∗
t+1 − δ)(1− β)(1− α)kα∗t
As we established in Lemma 2, agents born in country 1 con-
sumes more (less) when the world economy happens to be beyond
(below) the golden rule allocation.
A.3 Labour-augmenting technological progress
The aim of this section is to show how to get the condition for coun-
try 1 to run a trade deficit in the long-run under labour-augmenting
technological progress (equation (1.26)). Under this assumption,
the production function is still homogeneous of degree one in the
two arguments:
Yi,t = F (Ki,t, Ai,tLi,t) Ai,t = (1 + g)Ai,t−1
where, in principle, A1,0 6= A2,0.
We define kˆi,t ≡ Ki,tAi,tLi,t as capital per effective worker. The first-
order conditions of the firms now become:
rt = f
′(kˆi,t)− δ
wˆt = f(kˆi,t)− f ′(kˆi,t)kˆi,t
where wˆt ≡ wi,tAi,t .
Taxes must grow at the same rate of technological progress, for
the tax to have an impact on savings in the long-run: τ1,t = (1 +
g)τ1,t−1. At each t, because L1,tτ1,t = L1,t−1b1,t must hold, b1,t =
τ1,t(1 + n). Therefore, the budget constraints become:
cti,t = wi,t − τi,t − si,t
cti,t+1 = si,t(1 + rt+1) + τi,t(1 + n)(1 + g)
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where τ2 = 0. The market clearing condition for capital expressed
in capital per effective worker becomes:
kˆ∗t+1(1 + n)(1 + g) = ρˆ1sˆ
∗
1,t + ρˆ2sˆ
∗
2,t
where ρˆi ≡ Li,tAi,tLtAt . Following the same steps as in section 2.3, we
derive the balance of trade per effective worker for country 1:
tˆb
∗
1,t ≡ [sˆ∗1,t−(1+n)(1+g)kˆ∗t+1]−
1 + r∗t
(1 + n)(1 + g)
[sˆ∗1,t−1−kˆ∗t (1+n)(1+g)]
which at the steady state simplifies as follows:
tˆb
∗
1 = −zˆ∗1
(1 + n)(1 + g)− (1 + r∗)
(1 + n)(1 + g)
≈ −zˆ∗1
(n+ g)− r∗
1 + n+ g
where zˆ∗1 ≡ Z
∗
1,t
A1,tL1,t
.
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Appendix B
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1
Since ki,t+1 =
(
rt+1
αi
) 1
αi−1 , rt+1 = φ(rt) and rt = αiki,t
αi−1, we
can write the following accumulation equation for the capital stock
per capita of country i:
ki,t+1 =
(
φ(αik
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 1
αi−1
We now compute the first and the second derivative:
∂ki,t+1
∂ki,t
=
(
φ(αik
α−1
i,t )
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
· φ′(rt) · kαi−2i,t
∂2ki,t+1
(∂ki,t)2
= φ′′(rt) · kαi−2i,t ·
(
φ(αik
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
+
+ φ′(rt) · (αi − 2)kαi−3i,t ·
(
φ(αik
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
+
+ φ′(rt) · kαi−2i,t · (2− αi)
(
φ(αik
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 3−αi
αi−1
φ′(rt)k
αi−2
i,t
The first derivative is positive since φ′(rt) > 0 by Lemma 10. The
second derivative is negative since φ′′(rt) < 0. Therefore, the above
function is increasing and concave.
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Proof of Proposition 12
We must show that y1,t > y2,t for any rt ≥ r∗.
y1,t > y2,t ⇔
(
rt
α1
) α1
α1−1
>
(
rt
α2
) α2
α2−1
After a few steps, the inequality can be rearranged as follows:
rt >
α
α2(1−α1)
α2−α1
2
α
α1(1−α2)
α2−α1
1
≡ r¯
Our strategy is the following. We know that raut2 > r
∗ > raut1 by
Proposition 11. If we can show that raut1 > r¯, then r
∗ > r¯ and
therefore the inequality holds for any rt > r∗.
raut1 > r¯ ⇔
α1(1 + n)
(1− α1)(1− β) >
α
α2(1−α1)
α2−α1
2
α
α1(1−α2)
α2−α1
1
which, upon rearranging, becomes:
1 + n
(1− α1)(1− β) >
(
α2
α1
)α2(1−α1)
α2−α1
which is the condition stated in the Proposition.
Proof of Lemma 4
Given r∗t , the autarkic interest rate of country i is derived by
manipulating the domestic capital market clearing equation. We
find that rauti,t+1 ≡
[
(1+n)αi
(1−αi)(1−β)
]1−αi
r∗αit .
To start with, we verify that raut2,t+1 > r
aut
1,t+1 for any r
∗
t > r∗.
Rearranging the inequality, we obtain:
r∗t >
1 + n
1− β

(
α1
1−α1
)1−α1
(
α2
1−α2
)1−α2

1
α2−α1
≡ r˜
Next, we prove that raut1 > r˜:
α1(1 + n)
(1− α1)(1− β) >
1 + n
1− β

(
α1
1−α1
)1−α1
(
α2
1−α2
)1−α2

1
α2−α1
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After a few steps, we obtain α1 < α2. Hence, the inequality holds.
Since we know that raut2 > r
∗ > raut1 , then r
∗ > r˜ and therefore the
above inequality holds as long as r∗t > r∗.
Finally, we prove that raut2,t+1 > r
∗
t+1 > r
aut
1,t+1. The argument
is now routine. If rauti,t+1 > r∗t+1 for every i, we would have that∑
i zi(r
∗
t , r
∗
t+1) > 0. The opposite is true for r
∗
t+1 > rauti,t+1. Given
r∗t , the equilibrium interest rate at t + 1 must lie between the cor-
responding autarkic steady states for the world capital market to
clear.
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Appendix C
C.1 The cash-in-advance constraints in the young
age
Suppose that agents face cash-in-advance constraints in both peri-
ods of life. Consider the constraints of the agent born in country
1:
(λ11(s)) p
1(s)[c111(s)− ω111(s)] 6 −q1(s)m¯11(s) (C.1)
(λm1 (s))
L∑
`=2
q`(s)m¯`1(s) + q
1(s)m11(s) 6 q1(s)m¯11(s) (C.2)
(λ`1(s)) p
`(s)c`11(s) + q
`(s)m`1(s) 6 q`(s)m¯`1(s) ` 6= 1(C.3)
(λ`1(ss
′)) p`(s′)[c`21(ss
′)− ω`21(s′)] 6 q`(s′)m`1(s) ∀ s′(C.4)
m¯`1 > 0 m`1 > 0 ∀ ` (C.5)
Obviously, ω`21(s
′) = 0 for ` 6= 1. First, the agent would decide how
much domestic endowment to consume and then would sell the rest
in exchange for the domestic currency (m¯11(s)). Then, he would
possibly keep part of the domestic currency to consume the domes-
tic good when old (m11(s)) and buy foreign currencies in order to
be able to buy foreign goods (m¯`1(s)). Part of the foreign currencies
will be used to consume the foreign goods today and part will be
stored in order to buy the goods tomorrow (m`1(s)).
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The necessary conditions for a maximum are:
c111(s) : u
1
1(c11(s)) = λ
1
1(s)p
1(s)
c`11(s) : u
`
1(c11(s)) = λ
`
1(s)p
`(s) ∀ ` 6= 1
c`21(ss
′) : β1ρ(ss′)v`1(c21(ss
′)) = λ`1(ss
′)p`(s′) ∀ s′
m¯11(s) : −λ11(s)q1(s) + λm1 (s)q1(s) 6 0
= 0 if m¯11(s) > 0
m¯`1(s) : −λm1 (s)q`(s) + λ`1(s)q`(s) 6 0
= 0 if m`1(s) > 0 ` 6= 1
m11(s) : −λm1 (s)q1(s) +
∑
s′
λ11(ss
′)q1(s′) 6 0
= 0 if m11(s) > 0
m`1(s) : −λ`1(s)q`(s) +
∑
s′
λ`1(ss
′)q`(s′) 6 0
= 0 if m`1(s) > 0 ` 6= 1
and
λ11(s){−q1(s)m¯11(s)− p1(s)[c111(s)− ω111(s)]} = 0
λ11(s) > 0
λm1 (s){q1(s)m¯11(s)−
L∑
`=2
q`(s)m¯`1(s)− q1(s)m11(s)} = 0
λm2 (s) > 0
λ`1(s){q`(s)m¯`1(s)− p`(s)c`11(s)− q`(s)m`1(s)} = 0
λ`2(s) > 0 ` 6= 1
λ`1(ss
′){q`(s′)m`1(s)− p`(s′)[c`21(ss′)− ω21(s′)]} = 0
λ`1(ss
′) > 0 ∀ `, s′
By monotonicity, (C.1), (C.3) and (C.4) are binding. Then, (C.3)
can be substituted into (C.2). As a consequence, (C.2) must be
binding as well. Since all constraints are binding, the budget con-
straints can be rearranged as follows:
p(s) · [c11(s)− ω11(s)] = −q(s) ·m1(s)
p`(s′)[c`21(ss
′)− ω`21(s′)] = q`(s′)m`1(s) ∀ `, s′
m`1(s) > 0 ` = 1, ..., L
which is the same problem stated in the main body of the chap-
ter. It can also be checked that the necessary conditions of the
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above problem are identical to the necessary conditions of a prob-
lem in which the young do not face cash-in-advance constraints.
Since agent 1 is not endowed with foreign goods, we must have
that m`1(s) > 0 for ` 6= 1 so that c`21(ss′) > 0. But if m`1(s) > 0,
then m¯`1(s) > 0, which is possible only if m¯
1
1(s) > 0. Therefore, at
the solution λ11(s) = λ
m
1 (s) = λ
`
1(s) ≡ λ1(s).
C.2 Derivation of portfolios in the special case
Solving the maximization problem involves the following steps. First,
combine (3.19) and (3.20):
pi1(s)c11h(s) = pi
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) (C.6)
Plug this equation into the young’s budget constraint and get:
pi1(s)c11h(s) =
1
2
[wh(s)−m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)] (C.7)
where wh(s) is wealth in state s. Take the first-order conditions for
good 1 in all spots and plug them into (3.22):
1
pi1(s)c11h(s)
= βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)
pi1(s′)c12h(ss′)
(C.8)
Then, substitute (C.7) and (3.25) into (C.8) and obtain:
m1h(s)
(
1 +
1
2
βh
)
=
1
2
βh[wh(s)− e(s)m2h(s)] (C.9)
Now take (C.6) and this time rewrite the budget constraint when
young getting rid of good 1. Follow the same steps as for good 1 in
combining (3.23), (3.20) and (3.21) for good 2. Then, plug in the
rewritten budget constraint in state s and (3.26):
e(s)m2h
(
1 +
1
2
βh
)
=
1
2
βh[wh(s)−m1h(s)] (C.10)
Equations (C.9) and (C.10) yield agent h’s demand for the curren-
cies:
m1h(s) =
1
2
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
m2h(s) =
1
2
βh
1 + βh
wh(s)
e(s)
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C.3 Derivation of portfolios in the leading ex-
ample
The derivation of portfolios with isoelastic utility functions is a bit
more complicated than in the log case. First, combine (3.34), and
(3.31) and (3.33) for ` = 1:
c11h(s)
− 1
εh
pi1(s)
= βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)c11h(ss
′)−
1
εh
pi1(s′)
and rewrite it as follows:
pi1(s)
1−εh
εh
[pi1(s)c11h(s)]
1
εh
= βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
[pi1(s′)c11h(ss′)]
1
εh
Plugging pi1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(s) for every s
′, we can sum up the
numerators in the right hand side and elevate both sides of the
equation to εh:
pi1(s)
1−εh
pi1(s)c11h(s)
= βεhh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
m1h(s)
(C.11)
As in the log case, using the first-order conditions for the goods in
state s we can write:
c11h(s)
− 1
εh
pi1(s)
=
c21h(s)
− 1
εh
pi2(s)e(s)
After some manipulations, the above equation can be rewritten as
follows:
pi2(s)e(s)c21h(s) =
[pi2(s)e(s)]1−εh
pi1(s)1−εh
pi1(s)c11h(s) (C.12)
Now, plug (C.12) into the budget constraint when young and ob-
tain:
pi1(s)c11h(s) =
pi1(s)1−εh
pi1(s)1−εh + [pi2(s)e(s)]1−εh
[wh(s)−m1h(s)−e(s)m2h(s)]
Plug it into (C.11) and rearrange:
m1h(s) =
βh
εh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
[wh(s)− e(s)m2h(s)]
pi1(s)1−εh + [pi2(s)e(s)]1−εh + βεhh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
(C.13)
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Now, combine (3.35) with (3.33) for ` = 2:
λh(s)e(s) = βh
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)c22h(ss
′)−
1
εh
pi2(s′)
Multiplying and dividing each term of the right hand side by pi2(s′)
1
εh
and then substituting pi2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(s), we can sum the nu-
merators on the right hand side and get the following equation:
λh(s) = βh
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
m2h(s)
1
εh e(s)
Because λh(s) =
∑
s′ λ
1
h(ss
′), we can write:
βh
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
m1h(s)
1
εh︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
s′ λ
1
h(ss
′)
= βh
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
ε
m2h(s)
1
εh e(s)
or
m1h(s)
m2h(s)
= e(s)εh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh (C.14)
The higher is the exchange rate (the price of currency 2), the higher
is the relative demand for currency 1
(
m1h(s)
m2h(s)
)
. The relative demand
is also a function of expected (nominal) prices in the two countries,
which reflect the purchasing power of the two currencies, in a way
that depends on the agents’ elasticity of substitution for the two
goods.
Solving (C.13) and (C.14) simultaneously, we obtain the demand
for the two currencies:
m1h(s) =
βεhh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
Ah(s)
wh(s) (C.15)
m2h(s) =
βεhh e(s)
−εh
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
ε
]εh
Ah(s)
wh(s) (C.16)
where
Ah(s) ≡ pi1(s)1−εh + [pi2(s)e(s)]1−εh + βεhh
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)pi1(s′)
1−εh
ε
]εh
+
+ βεhh e(s)
1−εh
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)pi2(s′)
1−εh
εh
]εh
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C.4 Derivation of the demand functions when
young
Let us recall the budget constraint of agent h born in state s:
pi1(s)c11h(s) + pi
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) = wh(s)−m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)
Firstly, we can obtain total expenditure by substituting the demand
for the currencies (3.39) and (3.40):
pi1(s)c11h(s) + pi
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) =
p1(s)1−εh + [pi2(s)e(s)]1−εh
Ah(s)
wh(s)
Combining the above equation with (C.12), we can derive the de-
mand functions of the young agents.
C.5 The balance of trade in the Lucas model
We will use the same notation as above to facilitate the comparison
between Lucas [44] and this chapter. Since in equilibrium c1h(s) =
1
2
ω1(s) and c2h(s) =
1
2
ω2(s) for every h, each agent exports (imports)
half of the domestic (foreign) good in each period. Here is the
balance of trade of country 1 under the normalization that q1(s) =
1:
tb1(s) ≡ 1
2
pi1(s)ω1(s)− 1
2
pi2(s)e(s)ω2(s) (C.17)
The nominal price levels are:
pi1(s) =
M1
ω1(s)
pi2(s) =
M2
ω2(s)
By arbitrage, the price of good 2 in the domestic currency must be
equal to the the price of good 2 expressed in the nume´raire currency
divided by the exchange rate:
pi2(s) =
pi1(s)pi(s)
e(s)
(C.18)
where the price of good 2 expressed in the nume´raire currency (the
numerator at the right hand side) is given by the price of good 1
multiplied by relative prices (pi(s)). Now, assume that the instan-
taneous utility function is isoelastic:
u(c1h, c
2
h) =
c1h
1− 1
ε
1− 1
ε
+
c2h
1− 1
ε
1− 1
ε
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It may be checked that relative prices are:
pi(s) =
u2(
1
2
ω1, 1
2
ω2)
u1(
1
2
ω1, 1
2
ω2)
=
[
ω2(s)
ω1(s)
]− 1
ε
Substituting the nominal and the relative prices into equation (C.18),
we get:
e(s) =
M1
M2
(
ω2(s)
ω1(s)
)1− 1
ε
We can now plug all prices into (C.17) and obtain:
tb1(s) =
1
2
M1
[
1−
(
ω2(s)
ω1(s)
)1− 1
ε
]
When ε > 1, the balance of trade is always in surplus (deficit) as
long as the country’s endowment is higher (lower) than the other.
A positive (negative) shock in country 1 means that the domestic
currency appreciates (depreciates). For ε < 1, the opposite occurs.
Note that trade is balanced only as long as ω1(s) = ω2(s).
C.6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section of the Appendix, we report the robustness checks
that we performed for the two examples. For both examples, we
vary the elasticity of substitution from 0.5 to 8 and ρ(ss) between
0.4 and 0.9.
Similar observations can be made for both examples. For high
values of the elasticity, agents react more to changes in relative
prices and therefore trade imbalances are larger. Since countries
trade more, portfolios holdings are more volatile across states. As
a consequence, net foreign asset positions are larger as well. Note
that valuation effects increase at first and eventually decrease for
high values of the elasticity. If the endowment process is i.i.d., the
exchange rate is constant since agents’ expectations of price levels
are not conditional on the state of birth. The higher is persistence,
the more different are the expectations of agents born in different
states of nature. This makes the exchange rate more volatile, and
therefore valuation effects increase with persistence. We have also
seen that money demand depends on current wealth and prices,
as well as price expectations. If the process is highly persistent,
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expectations vary a lot across states and portfolios are more volatile.
Therefore, trade imbalances increase with persistence.
Table C.1: Varying the elasticity of substitution parameter (Example 1)
θ(1) tbi(21) e(1) NFAi(1) r
2(21) V ALi(21) ∆NFAi(21)
θ(2) tbi(12) e(2) NFAi(2) r
2(12) V ALi(12) ∆NFAi(12)
ε = 0.5 0.5253 0.7579 0.9120 0.0432 -0.1260 -0.6386 0.1193
[0.5642] [2.1130] [0.7977] [0.1417] [-0.3313] [-1.7650] [0.3480]
0.4856 -0.8100 1.0435 -0.0762 0.1442 0.6907 -0.1193
[0.4467] [-2.5776] [1.1929] [-0.2063] [0.4954] [2.2296] [-0.3480]
ε = 1 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0
[0.5] [0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0]
0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0
[0.5] [0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0]
ε = 1.5 0.4917 -0.2876 1.0227 -0.0538 0.0375 0.1872 -0.1004
[0.4778] [-0.8668] [1.0605] [-0.1547] [0.1156] [0.5713] [-0.2955]
0.5060 0.2824 0.9857 0.0466 -0.0362 -0.1819 -0.1004
[0.5200] [0.8206] [0.9506] [0.1408] [-0.1036] [-0.5251] [0.2955]
ε = 2 0.4874 -0.4429 1.0309 -0.1012 0.0515 0.2571 -0.1858
[0.4661] [-1.3442] [1.0830] [-0.2920] [0.1604] [0.7943] [-0.5499]
0.5092 0.4319 0.9804 0.0846 -0.0490 -0.2462 0.1858
[0.5306] [1.2476] [0.9333] [0.2579] [-0.1382] [-0.6976] [0.5499]
ε = 4 0.4800 -0.7081 1.0349 -0.2321 0.0548 0.2770 -0.4311
[0.4461] [-2.1484] [1.0905] [-0.6741] [0.1712] [0.8748] [-1.2736]
0.5148 0.6894 0.9811 0.1991 -0.0520 -0.2583 0.4311
[0.5488] [1.9846] [0.9311] [0.5985] [-0.1462] [-0.7110] [1.2736]
ε = 8 0.4753 -0.8709 1.0295 -0.3530 0.0371 0.1907 -0.6802
[0.4336] [-2.6140] [1.0669] [-1.0377] [0.1137] [0.6099] [-2.0041]
0.5183 0.8551 0.9927 0.3272 -0.0357 -0.1749 0.6802
[0.5601] [2.4763] [0.9580] [0.9664] [-0.1021] [-0.4722] [2.0041]
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Table C.2: Varying the persistence parameter (Example 1)
θ(1) tbi(21) e(1) NFAi(1) r
2(21) V ALi(21) ∆NFAi(21)
θ(2) tbi(12) e(2) NFAi(2) r
2(12) V ALi(12) ∆NFAi(12)
ρ = 0.4 0.4898 -0.3458 1.0004 -0.2014 -0.01224 -0.0629 -0.4087
[0.4729] [-1.0181] [0.9884] [-0.5973] [-0.0358] [-0.1923] [-1.2104]
0.5071 0.3480 1.0128 0.2073 0.0124 0.0607 0.4087
[0.5241] [1.0369] [1.0251] [0.6131] [0.0371] [0.1735] [1.2104]
ρ = 0.5 0.4894 -0.3647 1.0060 -0.1832 0 0 -0.3647
[0.4716] [-1.0796] [1.0060] [-0.5407] [0] [0] [-1.0796]
0.5076 0.3647 1.0060 0.1815 0 0 0.3647
[0.5254] [1.0796] [1.0060] [0.5389] [0] [0] [1.0796]
ρ = 0.6 0.4888 -0.3864 1.0127 -0.1613 0.0143 0.0726 -0.3138
[0.4700] [-1.1521] [1.0269] [-0.4734] [0.0430] [0.2229] [-0.9292]
0.5080 0.3837 0.9984 0.1525 -0.0141 -0.0699 0.3138
[0.5269] [1.1280] [0.9846] [0.4558] [-0.0411] [-0.1988] [0.9292]
ρ = 0.8 0.4874 -0.4429 1.0309 -0.1012 0.0515 0.2571 -0.1858
[0.4661] [-1.3442] [1.0830] [-0.2920] [0.1604] [0.7943] [-0.5499]
0.5092 0.4319 0.9804 0.0846 -0.0490 -0.2462 0.1858
[0.5306] [1.2476] [0.9333] [0.2579] [-0.1382] [-0.6976] [0.5499]
ρ = 0.9 0.4865 -0.4807 1.0437 -0.0582 0.0763 0.3774 -0.1033
[0.4635] [-1.4751] [1.1219] [-0.1656] [0.2437] [1.1715] [-0.3036]
0.5100 0.4633 0.9697 0.0451 -0.0709 -0.3600 0.1033
[0.5330] [1.3223] [0.9021] [0.1380] [-0.1959] [-1.0187] [0.3036]
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Table C.3: Varying the elasticity of substitution parameter (Example 2)
θ(1) tbi(21) e(1) NFAi(1) r
2(21) V ALi(21) ∆NFAi(21)
θ(2) tbi(12) e(2) NFAi(2) r
2(12) V ALi(12) ∆NFAi(12)
ε = 0.5 0.4153 -0.7149 1.3974 -0.0448 0.1093 0.6129 -0.1020
[0.3973] [-1.6507] [1.4893] [-0.1113] [0.2600] [1.4245] [-0.2262]
0.4451 0.6738 1.2597 0.0572 -0.0985 -0.5718 0.1020
[0.4636] [1.4469] [1.1820] [0.1149] [-0.2063] [-1.2207] [0.2262]
ε = 1 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0
[0.5] [0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0]
0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0
[0.5] [0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0]
ε = 1.5 0.5286 0.2055 0.8990 0.0374 -0.0278 -0.1330 0.0725
[0.5352] [0.4525] [0.8837] [0.0807] [-0.0606] [-0.2913] [0.1612]
0.5177 -0.2083 0.9247 -0.0351 0.0286 0.1358 -0.0725
[0.5111] [-0.4662] [0.9407] [-0.0805] [0.0645] [0.3050] [-0.1612]
ε = 2 0.5429 -0.3124 0.8543 0.0677 0.0391 0.1814 -0.1310
[0.5530] [-0.7018] [0.8345] [0.1450] [0.0889] [0.4103] [-0.2915]
0.5264 0.3069 0.8877 -0.0633 -0.0376 -0.1758 0.1310
[0.5162] [0.6745] [0.9087] [-0.1465] [-0.0817] [-0.3830] [0.2915]
ε = 4 0.5650 0.4716 0.7964 0.1500 -0.0399 -0.1784 0.2932
[0.5809] [1.0361] [0.7769] [0.3222] [-0.0864] [-0.3841] [0.6510]
0.5388 -0.4802 0.8295 -0.1432 0.0416 0.1870 -0.2932
[0.5226] [-1.0790] [0.8504] [-0.3298] [0.0946] [0.4270] [-0.6520]
ε = 8 0.5767 0.5718 0.7737 0.2280 -0.0273 -0.1181 0.4537
[0.5961] [1.2596] [0.7607] [0.4947] [-0.0597] [-0.2533] [1.0063]
0.5444 -0.5788 0.7954 -0.2257 0.0280 0.1251 -0.4537
[0.5245] [-1.2942] [0.8090] [-0.5116] [0.0635] [0.2879] [-1.0063]
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Table C.4: Varying the persistence parameter (Example 2)
θ(1) tbi(21) e(1) NFAi(1) r
2(21) V ALi(21) ∆NFAi(21)
θ(2) tbi(12) e(2) NFAi(2) r
2(12) V ALi(12) ∆NFAi(12)
ρ = 0.4 0.5412 0.2461 0.8744 0.1435 0.0094 0.0428 0.2889
[0.5492] [0.5483] [0.8795] [0.3215] [0.0211] [0.0946] [0.6429]
0.5280 -0.2450 0.8663 -0.1454 0.0093 -0.0439 -0.2889
[0.5200] [-0.5429] [0.8613] [-0.3214] [-0.0207] [-0.1000] [0.6429]
ρ = 0.5 0.5415 0.2581 0.8706 0.1294 0 0 0.2581
[0.5499] [0.5737] [0.8706] [0.2798] [0] [0] [0.5737]
0.5277 -0.2581 0.8760 -0.1287 0 0 -0.2581
[0.5193] [-0.5737] [0.8706] [-0.2869] [0] [0] [-0.5737]
ρ = 0.6 0.5419 0.2721 0.8661 0.1126 -0.0107 -0.0496 0.2225
[0.5508] [0.6028] [0.8604] [0.2469] [-0.0237] [-0.1084] [0.4944]
0.5273 -0.2734 0.8755 -0.1099 0.0109 0.0509 -0.2225
[0.5184] [-0.6095] [0.8813] [-0.2475] [0.0243] [0.1151] [-0.4944]
ρ = 0.8 0.5429 -0.3124 0.8543 0.0677 0.0391 0.1814 -0.1310
[0.5530] [-0.7018] [0.8345] [0.1450] [0.0889] [0.4103] [-0.2915]
0.5264 0.3069 0.8877 -0.0633 -0.0376 -0.1758 0.1310
[0.5162] [0.6745] [0.9087] [-0.1465] [-0.0817] [-0.3830] [0.2915]
ρ = 0.9 0.5436 0.3292 0.8465 0.0379 -0.0546 -0.2571 0.0721
[0.5545] [0.7203] [0.8179] [0.0797] [-0.1173] [-0.5597] [0.1606]
0.5258 -0.3379 0.8954 -0.0342 0.0578 0.2658 -0.0721
[0.5149] [-0.7633] [0.9266] [-0.0809] [0.1329] [0.6027] [-0.1606]
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